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ESSAY
FASHIONING A GENERAL COMMON LAW FOR
EMPLOYMENT IN AN AGE OF STATUTES
Michael C. Harper†
The clarion yet careful pronouncement of Erie, “There is no federal general
common law,” opened the way to what, for want of a better term, we may
call specialized federal common law.
Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405 (1964) (citation omitted).
[W]hen we have concluded that Congress intended terms . . . to be understood in light of agency law, we have relied on the general common law of
agency, rather than on the law of any particular State,
to give meaning to these terms.
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740
(1989) (Marshall, J., for a unanimous Court).
In “cases of division of opinion a choice had to be made and naturally we
chose the view we thought was right”. In judging what was “right”, a preponderating balance of authority would normally be given weight, as it no
doubt would generally weigh with courts, but it has not
been thought to be conclusive.
HERBERT WECHSLER, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORT
DIRECTOR 6 (1966) (citation omitted).
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CONCLUSION—A FEDERAL-STATE LAWMAKING ENTERPRISE . . . . . . . . 1337
INTRODUCTION
Judge Henry J. Friendly’s eloquent and cogent defense of Justice
Louis Brandeis’s opinion in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins1 highlighted
the post-Erie flowering of a new Court-crafted federal common law,
“truly uniform,” and, unlike the rejected federal general common law
of Justice Joseph Story,2 “binding in every forum” and “therefore . . .
predictable and useful as its predecessor . . . was not.”3 In the half
century since Judge Friendly’s praise, this specialized and binding federal common law has blossomed further with expanding federal legislation and corresponding additional praise.4 Neither Justice Brandeis
nor his former clerk Judge Friendly nor other subsequent commentators, however, seem to have fully appreciated the continuing post-Erie
role of the Court in the multijurisdictional enterprise of developing, if
not discovering,5 a best or most enlightened general common law for
1

304 U.S. 64 (1938).
In Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), Justice Story embraced the existence of
a “true” general commercial law, by holding that federal courts should apply their own
understanding of this general commercial law rather than the understanding expressed in
state-court decisions in applicable jurisdictions. Id. at 19–20.
3
Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 383, 405 (1964).
4
See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 881 (1986) (arguing there have been no meaningfully articulated limits on judicial
power to make federal common law); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal
Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1985) (breaking down barriers within different forms of federal judicial law making); Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie – the Thread, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1682 (1974) (arguing that the Constitution imposes a distinctive, independently significant limit on the authority of the federal courts to displace state law); Jay
Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585 (2006)
(crafting a theory that both justifies courts’ power to create federal law and guides the
discretionary exercise of this power).
5
“[I]t will hardly be contended that the decisions of Courts constitute laws. They
are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are; and are not of themselves laws.” Swift, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18. For Justice Story, there surely was at least “true” law governing “negotiable instruments” to be discovered, rather than created for particular times and nations.
In his opinion in Swift, Justice Story quotes Cicero: “Non erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis, alia
nunc, alia posthac, sed et apud omnes gentes, et omni tempore, una eademque lex obtenebit.”
(“There will not be one law of Rome and another of Athens; there will not be one law now
and another after this; but among all nations, and in every time, one and the same law will
hold.”) Id. at 9.
The notion of a true general common law distinct from local law, for all courts—
including federal courts—to labor to determine, was only of Justice Story’s time, or even of
an earlier time, not of Story’s creation. The Swift decision “summed up prior attitudes and
expressions in cases that had come before [the] Court and lower federal courts for at least
thirty years, at law as well as in equity. The short of it is that the doctrine was congenial to
the jurisprudential climate of the time.” Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 102–03
(1945); see generally William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513 (1984) (arguing that
the early understanding of section 34 was closer to the holding in Swift than is currently
2
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all in an age of statutes. This post-Erie role derives in large part from
the Court’s delegated authority to make law by filling gaps in federal
statutes. This law making authority, though confined by the words,
structure, and purposes of the statutes, rather than just by precedent,
both draws on and potentially influences state common law. It thus
enables the Court not only to render statutory constructions that command all courts, but also to participate in a general common-law-making process of persuasion, not unlike that in which the federal courts
participated during the Swift v. Tyson regime.
The Court’s potential participation in the general
common-law-making process generally has been ignored by legal commentators, perhaps because of a resistance to recognizing statutory
construction as akin to the law making of common-law judges. The
Court, however, has understood the relevance of the general common
law to its law making under federal statutes. For instance, in a series
of decisions interpreting the scope of the employment relationship
reached by various federal regulatory statutes, including the federal
Copyright Act treated in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,6
the Court has explicitly acknowledged its participation in the general
common-law-making process.7 In this series of decisions, the Court
has claimed to base its interpretation of the scope of the employment
relationship on a general common law of agency, drawn in part from
the Restatement (Second) of Agency of the American Law Institute
(ALI), rather than the law set by a particular state.8 The Court’s interpretations set law binding in state courts for the meaning of the federal statutes; but like the federal general common law of the Swift era,
the Court’s interpretations also can persuade, though not command,
supposed). For a thorough presentation of the historical context, see Stewart Jay, Origins of
Federal Common Law: Part One and Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 and 1231 (1985).
Justice Story’s “classical English view” of judicial decisions as only the evidence of a
true common law for judges to discover or determine was being rejected by many even
during the period in which Swift was decided and would lose further support over the
course of the nineteenth century. See Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and Stare Decisis:
The Critical Years, 1800 to 1850, 3 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 28, 31–32, 36 (1959); see also MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 1–30 (1977) (discussing
the developments in American law from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century).
6
490 U.S. 730 (1989).
7
See, e.g., Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 444–45
(2003) (explaining that the Court had “adopted a common-law test” in Darden); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24 (1992) (“Thus, we adopt a common-law
test for determining who qualifies as an ‘employee’ under ERISA . . . .”); Kelley v. S. Pac.
Co., 419 U.S. 318, 322–23 (1974) (acknowledging the Court’s “reaffirm[ation] that for the
purposes of the FELA the question of employment, or master-servant status, was to be
determined by reference to common-law principles.”); NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am.,
390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968) (asserting that all factors must be considered when common law
presents ambiguity).
8
See infra Part I.A.
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state courts to adjust their own particular understandings of the common law of agency.
Of course the Court’s capacity to participate in the general
common-law-making process is not confined to cases defining the employment relationship under the general law of agency. The Court
generally assumes that when a statute uses, without the inclusion of
any meaningful definition, terms and phrases drawn from the common law, Congress intended that these terms and phrases be interpreted in accord with that law.9 The determination of the common
law to be incorporated into such statutes affords the Court the opportunity to influence the development of the general common law.10
Moreover, some common-law-type issues may be presented by federal
statutes even in the absence of the express use of common-law terminology.11 How state courts resolve such issues under their common
9
See, e.g., Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 402 (2003) (“Absent
contrary direction from Congress, we begin our interpretation of statutory language with
the general presumption that a statutory term has its common-law meaning.”); Evans v.
United States, 504 U.S. 255, 259 (1991) (“It is a familiar ‘maxim that a statutory term is
generally presumed to have its common-law meaning.’” (quoting Taylor v. United States,
495 U.S. 575, 592 (1990)); United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957) (dictum)
(“[W]here a federal criminal statute uses a common-law term of established meaning without otherwise defining it, the general practice is to give that term its common-law
meaning . . . .”).
10
For instance, the Court in Scheidler, based in part on its understanding of the common law’s definition of extortion, interpreted the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012), to
apply only when an actor through coercion acquires, rather than merely deprives another
of a property right. 537 U.S. at 402–04. In Scheidler, therefore, the Court held that antiabortion protestors did not violate the Hobbs Act by coercively closing an abortion clinic.
Id. at 397. This interpretation of the common-law definition of extortion could discourage
judicial acceptance of a more expansive common-law definition. Cf. People v. Robey, No.
H032101, 2009 WL 3208689, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. 6th Dist. Oct. 7, 2009) (citing Scheidler in
explanation of California’s statutory requirement that property be exchanged as an element of the crime of extortion); Matthew T. Grady, Extortion May No Longer Mean Extortion
After Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 81 N.D. L. REV. 33 (2005) (contending that the Scheidler decision weakens the intended force of the Hobbs Act).
In Evans, the Court held that an affirmative act of inducement by a public official is
not an element of extortion “under color of official right,” as prohibited by the Hobbs Act.
504 U.S. at 256. The holding was based in part on the Court’s determination that a demand or request by the public official “was not an element of the offense” at common law.
Id. at 260. Justice Clarence Thomas in dissent contended that the majority misstated the
common law by failing to require the taking to be under a false pretense of official right.
Id. at 278, 279–80 (Thomas, J., dissenting). He claimed the majority thereby conflated the
common-law crimes of extortion and bribery. Id. at 283–84. Whether or not Justice
Thomas was correct, the majority’s interpretation of the relevant common-law definition
clearly could influence how states apply their own law.
11
See, e.g., Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 438–43 (1997)
(holding that an employee alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress cannot recover under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) for presymptomatic medical
monitoring costs); Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 551–58 (1994) (setting
conditions for an employee’s claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress under the
FELA); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 (1983) (setting culpability standards for punitive
damages in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)); see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
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law could be influenced by the Court’s resolution of the analogous
issues under the federal statutes.12 Furthermore, the federal courts’
authority to make “specialized federal common law” binding on all
courts within defined domains—such as maritime law,13 the law governing controversies between states,14 or the law governing the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements15—also enables the
Court concomitantly to suggest or support general doctrinal developments that potentially could be used by state courts in their discretion
to formulate their own common law.16
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (setting conditions for the issuance of permanent injunctions
under the Patent Act).
12
Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, provides a good example, as several state supreme courts
seem to have been influenced by its holding and reasoning. See, e.g., Hinton ex rel. Hinton
v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827, 830–32 (Ala. 2001) (citing Buckley and recognizing merit
in “these concerns”); Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 696 (Mich. 2005) (“We
share the concerns raised by the United States Supreme Court in Buckley.”); see also Victor
E. Schwartz, Cary Silverman & Christopher E. Appel, The Supreme Court’s Common Law Approach to Excessive Punitive Damage Awards: A Guide for the Development of State Law, 60 S.C. L.
REV. 881, 883, 912–14 (2009). eBay, 547 U.S. 388, may provide another example. See Mark
P. Gergen, et al., The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions,
112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 207–14, 215 & n.51 (2012) (contending that the Court’s formulation of conditions for the issuance of permanent injunctions departed significantly from
traditional equitable principles and has started to affect the issuance of injunctions in state
as well as federal courts). On the other hand, thus far neither Gottshall nor Smith seem to
have influenced state courts significantly. But cf. AALAR, Ltd. v. Francis, 716 So. 2d 1141,
1147 (Ala. 1998) (noting “current state of Alabama law is consistent with the ‘zone of
danger’ test discussed in Gottshall”); Winters v. Greeley, 545 N.E.2d 422, 426 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989) (citing Smith for the proposition that punitive damages can be awarded on the same
threshold culpability standard set for compensatory damages).
13
The federal courts’ authority to develop a specialized federal maritime common
law derives from the grant of jurisdiction over “admiralty and maritime” cases in Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution. See, e.g., Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S.
354, 360–61 (1959) (finding Article III, Section 2 empowers the federal courts to continue
the development of maritime law).
14
On the same day it decided Erie the Court announced, in another opinion by
Justice Brandeis, that “federal common law” would continue to govern interstate disputes
such as the equitable apportionment of interstate waters or interstate boundaries. See
Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938). This
federal common law was originally developed in suits between states under the original
jurisdiction of the Court. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 496 (1922) (per
curiam).
15
See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456–57 (1957) (inferring
authority to fashion federal common law to govern collective bargaining agreements from
grant of jurisdiction in section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 185, over suits governed by such agreements).
16
For instance, the Court’s decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471
(2008), establishing an upper limit of a 1:1 ratio of compensatory to punitive damages for
maritime cases governed by federal common law, could influence the development of state
common law on punitive damages. See Schwartz, supra note 12, at 914–15 (advocating that
state courts let Exxon Shipping influence them).
Similarly, had Congress not passed comprehensive regulation of water pollution, the
Court might have influenced the common law of nuisance by use of its authority, as asserted in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972), to develop a federal common law to govern interstate water pollution disputes. But cf. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois,
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The Court’s current potential role in the general common-lawmaking process is fully consistent with our contemporary positivist assumptions about the nature of law. It is not premised, as apparently
was Justice Story’s opinion in Swift v. Tyson,17 on the assumption that
something called law exists independently of rules set by human
agents through sovereign authority.18 The Court’s potential role in
the modern general common-law-making process is like that of state
supreme courts, which accept their participation in an ongoing interactive process of development and refinement in response both to
better understanding and analysis of the impact of current doctrine
and to social and political change.19
451 U.S. 304, 317–19 (1981) (holding comprehensive federal legislation displaces federal
common law governing interstate water pollution); cf. also Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011) (holding federal statutes displace any federal
common-law right to seek abatement of interstate pollution from carbon dioxide
emissions).
Even federal common-law cases encouraging the enforcement of arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements, e.g., Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 448 (specifically
enforcing agreement to arbitrate); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593 (1960) (arbitration awards interpreting and applying terms of collective agreements not subject to review on the merits), eventually might have encouraged the use of
arbitration in cases governed by state common law had the Court not obviated such influence by interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012), to preempt state-law
restrictions on agreements to arbitrate. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1,
10–11 (1984) (preempting a state law requiring claims brought under it to have judicial
consideration).
Further examples of the potential influence of specialized federal common law on
state common law could be drawn from specialized federal common law fashioned to protect the rights and obligations of the United States. See, e.g., Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947) (holding federal common law must be used to construe
federal government contracts; “[i]t is customary, where Congress has not adopted a different standard, to apply to the construction of government contracts the principles of general contract law”); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943) (“The
rights and duties of the United States on commercial paper which it issues are governed by
federal rather than local law.”).
17
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
18
[B]ut law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority behind it. The common law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called common law or not, is not the common
law generally but the law of that State existing by the authority of that State
without regard to what it may have been in England or anywhere else. . . .
[T]he authority and only authority is the State, and if that be so, the voice
adopted by the State as its own should utter the last word.
Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S.
518, 533–35 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
79 (1938) (quoting and discussing Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s dissent in Black &
White Taxicab & Transfer Co.). Or as famously expressed more colorfully by Justice Holmes,
“The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of
some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified . . . .” S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244
U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
19
For what remains in my view a classic description of judicial law making, see
Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501 (1948). See also
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The Court’s continuing role in general common law making is
reason for another round of praise, beyond that offered by Judge
Friendly, for the three-quarter-century-old decision in Erie. Not only
does Erie ensure the application of uniform substantive law between
federal and state courts in the same jurisdiction, but it does so without
restricting Congress from empowering, through statutory delegation,
an elite federal judiciary’s participation in the process of developing a
common law, which may, but does not have to, become more uniform
between jurisdictions20 as it becomes more refined and adapted to an
increasingly integrated national society and polity.
The Court’s participation in the general common-law-making
process can proceed in at least as many directions as those that can be
taken by any common-law-making court. For instance, the Court can
confirm as general common law the unanimous, nearly unanimous, or
predominant majority rule laid down by the various states. Alternatively, the Court can purport to follow such a rule as the general common-law rule, even as it subtly, or perhaps not so subtly, refines or
modifies that rule in its restatement for federal law.21 As modern lawyers, we should understand that any application of legal doctrine to
the particular facts of a case affects the meaning of that doctrine, if
only to an imperceptible and marginal extent.22 More significantly,
the Court can consider and expressly reject the adequacy of general
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988), especially chapters
four and seven, for how common law develops in response to social change.
20
As stated by Chief Justice John Marshall,
even in cases where the decisions of the Supreme Court are not to be considered as authority except in the courts of the United States, some advantage may be derived from their being known. It is certainly to be wished
that independent tribunals having concurrent jurisdiction over the same
subject should concur in the principles on which they determine the causes
coming before them. This concurrence can be obtained . . . by that mutual
respect which will probably be inspired by a knowledge of the grounds on
which their judgments respectively stand.
Letter to Congress (Feb. 7, 1817), reprinted in 2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND
THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1246 (1953). For discussions of
how American law became more uniform in the era of Swift during the pre-Civil War period, see RANDALL BRIDWELL & RALPH U. WHITTEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON
LAW 87–97 (1977) (discussing coexistence of local and a more uniform general commercial law); Fletcher, supra note 5, at 1513 (demonstrating how federal and state courts created a uniform body of marine insurance law).
21
Cf., e.g., McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916) (modifying,
without direct acknowledgement, the rule of negligence to apply to manufacturers without
privity with an injured purchaser).
22
See, e.g., Levi, supra note 19, at 502–03 (“The determination of similarity or difference is the function of each judge. Where case law is considered, and there is no statute,
he is not bound by the statement of the rule of law made by the prior judge even in the
controlling case. . . . The rules change as the rules are applied. More important, the rules
arise out of a process which, while comparing fact situations, creates the rules and then
applies them.”). At least we are realistic enough to recognize that courts act as lawmakers
within set doctrinal boundaries. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 197 (1979)

R
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common-law doctrine, and then offer in its place alternative doctrine
to fill the interstices and advance the purposes of the federal statute it
is interpreting. While this alternative doctrine is unlikely to influence
state common law immediately, it nonetheless can plant a seed that if
sufficiently hardy may eventually result in spreading vines throughout
the common law. Finally, the Court may potentially influence common-law developments by treating without any direct reference to the
common law an issue under a federal statute that is analogous to a
common-law issue.
However the Court proceeds, its participation in this general
common-law-making promises the benefits of federalism without the
costs of centralization. When fashioning their own responses to common-law issues, state courts do not have to follow the Court’s lead.
They have no incentive to do so beyond the persuasiveness of the
Court’s resolution of issues. State-court judges can still distinguish
themselves and their states with different creative responses that better express their states’ values.
The Court’s potential contemporary role in the general
common-law-making process can be well highlighted through examination of the Court’s treatment of several common-law issues on
which it has or could make important contributions to employment
law. The richness of employment law as a source of examples of federal influence on the general common law should not be surprising.
Employment law consists of a mosaic of federal and nonpreempted
state statutes laid over a range of common-law agency, tort, and contract doctrine relevant to the employment relationship.
In each of the examples I present, ALI Restatements—especially
the Restatement of Employment Law—play a prominent role. This is
not a coincidence. First, Restatements provide an alternative basis
from which to commence a search for a better common law in an age
shorn of Justice Story’s nineteenth-century belief that there is some
true law that judicial and other sovereign decisions only evidence. As
Herbert Wechsler stated almost a half century ago, Restatements do so
not only by purporting to aggregate and classify the variant doctrinal
choices of the states, but also by determining which of those choices is
“right” or best for the issues it addresses.23 Thus, while Restatements
do not represent an attempt to state the true general common law,
they do represent an attempt to state the best common law, considering the collective efforts of many decision makers in many
jurisdictions.
(“[W]ithin the admitted boundaries of their law-making powers courts act and should act
just as legislators do, namely, they should adopt those rules which they judge best.”).
23
See WECHSLER, supra page 1281.
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Second, all of the examples of federal participation in the general
common-law-making process highlighted in this Essay are at least
cited, and in some cases relied upon, in the Restatement of Employment Law. The Restatement of Employment Law’s partial reliance on
federal decisions itself illustrates how such decisions can play a role in
the development of general common law.24
I begin in Part I with consideration of the Court’s decisions that
invoke and formulate the general common law of agency to define the
scope of the employment relationships for various federal regulatory
statutes. This Part has two subparts. In the first, I describe the Court’s
participation in the formulation of common-law doctrine distinguishing employees from independent contractors, and stress how the
Court might sharpen that doctrine, without overruling its prior decisions, by adoption of refinements suggested by the Restatement of
Employment Law.25 Such adoption, I suggest, might occur through
review of decisions of a federal agency, the National Labor Relations
Board
(NLRB),
which itself
participates in the general
common-law-making process through its judicially reviewed law-making authority.26
In the second subpart of Part I, I consider the Court’s treatment,
through review of an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) guideline, of another limitation on the scope of the employment relationship: that which excludes controlling owners of employing entities from the class of employees protected by employment
regulatory statutes. I contend that this treatment, though purportedly
based on traditional common-law doctrine, is actually both a departure and a clarifying enhancement of that doctrine—an enhancement
that could be adopted by the states for purposes beyond antidiscrimination law.
In Part II, I turn to an example of how the general
common-law-making process also can be enhanced by the Court’s
consideration and rejection of general common-law doctrine in favor
of new common-law-type doctrine as the basis for interpretation of a
federal statute.27 The example is the Court’s formulation of a new
rule of limited vicarious liability to govern employer responsibility for
the harassment of employees by their supervisors. The new rule,
which the Court adopted after finding current common-law principles
24
As stated in the opening footnote, the author served as one of the Reporters for the
Restatement of the Law, Employment Law (RTEL). He was the principal author of two
Chapters of the RTEL relevant to this Essay, Chapter One, which defines the employment
relationship, and Chapter Four, which sets out general principles for employer liability for
harm to their employees.
25
See infra Part I.A.
26
See infra notes 72–89 and accompanying text.
27
See infra notes 126–29 and accompanying text.
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inadequate,28 is binding only for federal antidiscrimination statutes;29
it could, however, be usefully adapted by state courts as the basis for a
compromise resolution of liability issues under the common law.
Part III presents an example of how the Court’s articulation of
doctrine to govern a federal statute, even without reference to general
common-law precedent, may provide support for state judicial, and
statutory doctrinal innovations on common-law issues.30 The example
is the Court’s definition of the employer actions that may constitute
prohibited retaliation under the federal antidiscrimination in employment laws. State courts, though of course not compelled to adopt this
doctrine for law protecting employees asserting state-based rights or
discharging public duties, might sensibly borrow the doctrine in the
development of their common law.
Finally, in Part IV, through another example of the Court’s overt
modification of a common-law rule, I highlight a limitation on the
role of statutory interpretation in the general common-law-making
process. The example is the Court’s interpretation of Title VII to
modify what it considered to be the common-law rule for the imputation to an employer of vicarious liability for punitive damages for the
acts of an agent. I argue that the Court’s modification cannot provide
a general common-law principle because rules for the imputation of
punitive damages must vary with the policy balance made for various
statutory and common-law causes of action.
In a brief conclusion I note how the current general
common-law-making process can be an interactive one that not only
enables federal default rules to influence state common law, but also
allows state law developments to influence modifications in federal
common-law default rules.
I
THE GENERAL COMMON-LAW DEFINITION

OF

EMPLOYEE

A. Distinguishing Independent Contractors
In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,31 the Court considered competing claims to ownership of a copyright for a sculpture
from the sculptor and from the nonprofit unincorporated association
that had commissioned the sculpture.32 Ownership under the Copy28

See infra note 143–70 and accompanying text.
See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
30
See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
31
490 U.S. 730 (1989).
32
The Community for Creative Non-Violence was primarily concerned with reducing
homelessness and orally commissioned the statute to “dramatize the plight of the homeless.” Id. at 733.
29
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right Act of 197633 turned on whether the sculpture was among those
“works made for hire”34 “prepared by an employee within the scope of
his or her employment”35 or rather was made by a commissioned independent contractor.36 After noting the Copyright Act “nowhere defines the terms ‘employee’ or ‘scope of employment,’” the Court
concluded that Congress intended these terms to be defined by common-law agency doctrine.37 The Court based this conclusion primarily on what it described as a “well established” rule that “[w]here
Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under . . .
the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of
these terms.”38 The Court cited several of its past decisions39 that had
used the common law of agency to define an employment relationship for purposes of determining liability under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA),40 which requires a plaintiff to be employed
by a railroad from which he or she seeks recovery.41 Referring to
these cases, the Court stated that:
[W]hen we have concluded that Congress intended terms such as
“employee,” “employer,” and “scope of employment” to be understood in light of agency law, we have relied on the general common
law of agency, rather than on the law of any particular State, to give
meaning to these terms. . . . Establishment of a federal rule of
agency, rather than reliance on state agency law, is particularly appropriate here given the Act’s express objective of creating national,
uniform copyright law by broadly pre-empting state statutory and
common-law copyright regulation.42

After confirming through analysis of the structure and history of
the Copyright Act that Congress intended the use of the common law
of agency to define “employee” under the Act,43 the Court proceeded
33

17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2012).
Id. § 201(b).
35
Id. § 101.
36
Reid, 490 U.S. at 731.
37
Id. at 739–40.
38
Id. at 739 (quoting NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981)). The Court
in Amax Coal treated the regulation of union welfare funds as trusts under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–197. 453 U.S. at 324–25. The Court
held that Congress must have intended to incorporate into the LMRA commonly accepted
equitable principles, including the proposition that trustees owe complete duties of loyalty
to the beneficiaries of trusts. Id. at 329–30. To support this as a well-established principle
of equity, the Court relied in part on the Restatement (Second) of Trusts. Id.
39
Reid, 490 U.S. at 740 (1989) (citing Kelley v. S. Pac. Co., 419 U.S. 318, 322–23
(1974); Baker v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 359 U.S. 227, 228 (1959); Robinson v. Baltimore &
Ohio R.R. Co., 237 U.S. 84, 94 (1915)).
40
45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2012).
41
Id. § 51.
42
Reid, 490 U.S at 740 (citation omitted).
43
Id. at 741–50.
34

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-6\CRN603.txt

1292

unknown

Seq: 12

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

16-SEP-15

15:46

[Vol. 100:1281

to define federal agency common law by consideration of “the general
common law of agency” as expressed in the Restatement (Second) of
Agency and in prior Supreme Court and Court of Appeals decisions
defining the employment relationship for purposes of numerous federal statutes, including the FELA.44 In its description of the common
law, the Court seemed to accept the structure of section 220 of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency, which defines in its first section an
employee45 as “a person employed to perform services in the affairs of
another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other’s control or right to control,” but then in its second section lists ten “matters of fact, among
others” which are to be “considered” in “determining whether one
acting for another is [an employee] or an independent contractor.”46
Similarly, the Court stated that in determining employee status under
the common law of agency, it would “consider the hiring party’s right
to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished,” but then listed “other factors relevant to this inquiry.”47 The
Court drew a list of twelve other factors, not only from the second
subsection of section 220, but also from prior federal cases; and just as
its statement of the primary test differed somewhat from that of section 220, so did its list of relevant factors.48
44

Id. at 751.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958). Section 220 uses the traditional
common-law terminology of servant and master, rather than the current employee and
employer terms used by both the Restatement (Third) of Agency and the Restatement of
Employment Law.
46
Id. § 220. The ten section 220(2) “matters of fact” to be “considered” are:
“(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise
over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the
work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist
without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities,
tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the
employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of
master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.”
Id. § 220(2).
47
Reid, 490 U.S. at 751–52.
48
The Court’s list included the following factors:
[T]he skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties;
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the
hired party; the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how
45

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-6\CRN603.txt

2015]

unknown

Seq: 13

16-SEP-15

FASHIONING A GENERAL COMMON LAW

15:46

1293

Both the Court’s reliance on and refinement of section 220 of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency are significant. Together they reflect the Court’s active participation in the general common-lawmaking process. The Court’s refinement potentially could influence
the development of the common law in state courts, even as it sets
uniform law for purposes of the federal Copyright Act. Most significantly, the Court expanded on the second factor in section 220(2)—
“whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation
or business”49—with several additional factors relevant to determining
whether the putative employee performed the disputed work as part
of an independent business. The additional factors include: “the location of the work;” “whether the hiring party has the right to assign
additional projects to the hired party;” “the extent of the hired party’s
discretion over when and how long to work;” and “the hired party’s
role in hiring and paying assistants.”50 These factors, in addition to
one repeating a consideration listed in section 220(2)—whether the
hiring party or the hired party is the source of the instrumentalities or
tools—are all directly relevant to the question of whether the work
was performed as part of an independent business through which the
hired party could enhance his or her returns without proportionately
enhancing those of the employer. Consideration of these factors can
indicate that there is an employment relationship in the absence of
the hiring party’s control over the details of the hired party’s work, on
the one hand, or that there is not an employment relationship even
when the hiring party does have a right to control some of the details
of the work product, on the other hand.
Indeed, the Court’s application of its multifactor test in Community for Creative Non-Violence itself illustrated how the Court’s list of factors shifted the focus from the hiring party’s right to control the
details of the hired party’s work to whether the hired party did the
work as part of an independent business. The Court noted that members of the Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) “directed
enough of Reid’s work to ensure that he produced a sculpture that
met their specifications. But the extent of control the hiring party
exercises over the details of the product is not dispositive.”51 Instead,
the Court stated, other factors indicate the sculptor, Reid, was an independent contractor. Those factors included his supply of “his own
long to work; the method of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and
paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the
hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.
Id. (citations omitted).
49
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(b) (1958).
50
Reid, 490 U.S. at 751–52 (citations omitted).
51
Id. at 752 (citation omitted).
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tools,” his use of “his own studio,” his “absolute freedom to decide
when and how long to work” and to decide whether to do other
projects for CCNV, and his “total discretion in hiring and paying
assistants.”52 All of these considerations indicated how Reid could enhance earnings from his work by making independent business decisions about the use and allocation of his human capital, the labor of
others, and other resources, like tools and his studio, in which he had
invested.
The Court’s decision in Community for Creative Non-Violence could
have been influenced by the equitable appeal of the sculptor’s claim
of copyright ownership; under intellectual property law, unlike under
most employment law, employment status is not generally sought by
workers.53 A few terms later, in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Darden,54 however, the Court confirmed that it had reformulated
common-law doctrine to serve as a federal general-common law or default principle for distinguishing independent contractors from employees.55 Darden presented the question of whether an insurance
salesman who had pledged to sell only Nationwide policies had been
an employee of Nationwide under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA). If Darden, the salesman, had been an employee, he would have been able to enforce the provisions of ERISA to
protect his accrued benefits in Nationwide’s deferred compensation
plans made available to him while he represented Nationwide. If he
had been an independent contractor, he would not have been able to
invoke ERISA. The Court noted that ERISA’s definition of “employee” as “any individual employed by an employer” is “completely
circular and explains nothing.”56 Without any further direction from
Congress, the Court concluded it should follow the direction it took
in Community for Creative Non-Violence : “adopt a common-law test for
determining who qualifies as an ‘employee.’”57 The Darden Court
then quoted the passage from Community for Creative Non-Violence setting out this test, followed by a comparative citation to section 202(2)
and to an Internal Revenue Service ruling “setting forth 20 factors as
guides in determining whether an individual qualifies as a commonlaw ‘employee’ in various tax law contexts.”58
52

Id. at 752–53.
This also may be true when a worker seeks to bring a tort action for an injury free
of a workers’ compensation system that provides an exclusive remedy against the worker’s
employer.
54
503 U.S. 318 (1992).
55
See id. at 323–24.
56
Id. at 323 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
57
Id.
58
Id. at 323–24 (citing Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C. B. 296, 298–99).
53
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The Darden Court, however, did not further refine its federal
common-law default test by applying it to the facts of the case, choosing instead to remand the case to the court of appeals to do so.59 It
also declined to sharpen its formulation of the Community for Creative
Non-Violence federal common-law default test, instead quoting from an
earlier decision determining the existence of an employment relationship under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),60 which unhelpfully stated that “all of the incidents of the relationship must be
assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive.”61
The Community for Creative Non-Violence multifactor formulation of
the common-law distinction of employees from independent contractors has been cited not only in cases applying the Copyright Act,
where it commands other courts, but also in numerous decisions applying state law, where it can only persuade state courts in the manner of
federal decisions in the era of Swift v. Tyson.62 The citations in decisions applying state law demonstrate the Court’s participation in the
general common-law-making process even though the effect on the
outcome of the decisions is not clear. The fact that courts applying
state law consider the Community for Creative Non-Violence federal common-law formulation relevant itself indicates that these courts could
be persuaded by federal law decisions.
There are two interrelated reasons why it is difficult to determine
whether state-law decisions have been affected by any differences between the Community for Creative Non-Violence Court’s federal
common-law formulation and that of section 220(2), including the
greater focus of the former on the hired party’s discretion to exercise
independent business control. First, precisely because they are
59
503 U.S. at 328. The Court noted that the Court of Appeals had stated in dicta that
“‘Darden most probably would not qualify as an employee’ under traditional agency law
principles.” Id. In reaching its tentative judgment, the Court of Appeals relied on factors
that would be relevant to determining whether Darden operated an independent business
despite his exclusive representation of Nationwide. Darden v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
796 F.2d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 1986). These factors included his freedom “to exercise his
independent judgment as to the time, place and manner of soliciting and selling insurance
and servicing policy holders,” and to hire and fire clerical employees without securing
Nationwide’s approval, as well as his ownership of his building, his furniture and his automobile used for sales, and his payment of his clerical staff and other expenses out of his
commissions. Id.
60
NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254 (1968).
61
503 U.S. at 324 (quoting NLRB, 390 U.S. at 258). For discussion of the definition
of the employment relationship under the NLRA, see infra note 71–74 and accompanying
text.
62
See, e.g., Estrada v. City of Los Angeles, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 847 (Ct. App. 2013)
(defining “employee” under California Fair Employment and Housing Act); Bredesen v.
Tennessee Judicial Selection Comm’n, 214 S.W.3d 419, 431 (Tenn. 2007) (defining “employee” under Tennessee Human Rights Act); Mortg. Consultants, Inc. v. Mahaney, 655
N.E.2d 493, 496 n.2 (Ind. 1995) (defining “employee” under Indiana Workmen’s Compensation Act).
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multifactor tests that are not clearly tied to an ultimate standard,
neither the federal common-law formulation nor the section 220(b)
formulation constrain or guide decision makers in difficult cases.
Neither test, at least on its face, states the relative weight that should
be given to any factor or even why any particular factor is relevant.
This would not be the case if the formulations subordinated the
residual factors as ways to determine whether the hiring party had
some sort of right to control the physical details or manner and means
of the hired party’s work, the factor generally stated in section 220(1)
and stated first in the Community for Creative Non-Violence formulation.
As explained above,63 however, the Community for Creative Non-Violence
Court expressly rejected such subordination on the facts of that case.
Furthermore, even the comments to section 220 acknowledge that
employers may have “very attenuated” control over their employees,
providing such cogent examples as chefs in restaurants, “ship captains
and managers of great corporations,” and “skilled artisans.”64
The second reason it is difficult to trace the effect of the Court’s
participation in the general common-law-making process on the distinction of employees from independent contractors is that the
Court’s formulation of the federal default rule, at least to the extent it
highlights whether the hired party is operating an independent business, may better capture than does section 220(2) how state courts
actually decided many cases even before Community for Creative NonViolence. This may be particularly true for state-court decisions considering whether a hired party is an employee, not for purposes of vicarious liability, but for purposes of state statutes and common-law
fashioned, like much federal legislation, to protect employees.65 The
“right to control” test stated in section 220(1) was developed to determine whether hiring parties should be liable for the torts of those they
hire to do work for their benefit; the incentive-based rationale for
making that determination based on the hiring party’s right to control
the hired party’s work is obvious.66 The modern employment
63

See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 cmts. d, a, i (1958).
65
See, e.g., Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327, 335 (Ct.
App. 2007) (defining “employee” as determined by California Labor Code and state common law); Whittenberg v. Graves Oil & Butane Co. 827 P.2d 838, 844 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991)
(defining “employee” as determined by state workers’ compensation act); S.G. Borello &
Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t. of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1989) (stating that California common law determines test for employee status).
66
For the historical derivation of the right-to-control test, see generally MARC LINDER,
THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, Ch. 4
(1989) (discussing the vicarious liability and fellow-servant rule cases that developed the
common-law test); Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees
One And How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 323–24 (2001)
(describing how the NLRB interpreted the test in 1948).
64
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relationship, however, is governed by a matrix of sometimes overlapping federal and state statutes, and state common-law doctrine, which
provide greater protection to employees than to independent contractors. It would not be surprising if the common-law-making process on
the state as well as the federal level has taken into account this
modern reason for distinguishing employees from independent contractors. If so, that state common-law-making process, even independently of the federal process, could have begun to stress factors
relevant to whether the hired party retains discretion to operate an
independent business, with attendant risks and rewards. Such discretion, much more than the level of the principal’s control of the physical details of work, is relevant to the extent to which the hired party
needs the protections offered by modern regulation of the employment relationship.67
The Court could play a salutary role in accelerating this process
by adopting a more explicit reformulation of the general common
law, one that is more predictable and more constraining because it
explains the ultimate purposes of the many factors listed not only in
Community for Creative Non-Violence, but also in section 220(2), in the
IRS ruling cited in Darden, and in other multifactor formulations. It
could do so by purporting to state how the best decisions applying the
common law in both federal and state tribunals actually have decided
cases, and how they have made relevant and organized at least the
most important factors in the various lists.
Such a reformulation has in fact been offered in section 1.01 of
the Restatement of Employment Law. That section states that an individual renders services not as an employee but “as an independent
businessperson . . . when the individual in his or her own interest
exercises entrepreneurial control over important business decisions,
including whether to hire and where to assign assistants, whether to
purchase and where to deploy equipment, and whether and when to
provide service to other customers.”68 This formulation explains why
most of the factors listed in multifactor tests, including control over
67
A strong case can be made that the traditional right-to-control test for vicarious
liability itself was used as a factor to determine whether the hired party was operating an
independent business. See, RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW §1.01 cmt. d–e (2015) (citing, inter
alia, Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U.S. 518, 523–24 (1889); Sproul v. Hemmingway, 31
Mass. (14 Pick.) 1 (1833)).
68
Section 1.01 states in full:
§ 1.01. Conditions for Existence of Employment Relationship
(a) Except as provided in §§ 1.02 and 1.03, an individual renders services as an employee of an employer if
(1) the individual acts, at least in part, to serve the interests of the
employer,
(2) the employer consents to receive the individual’s services, and
(3) the employer controls the manner and means by which the
individual renders services, or the employer otherwise effectively
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the manner and means of work performance, are relevant to the distinction of employees from independent contractors, at least for purposes of regulatory and employee-protection laws. The factors are
relevant to whether the hired individual retains discretion to make
business decisions in the individual’s independent interests rather
than in the interests of the hiring party. Individuals who retain such
discretion may be less needful of legal protection. Although policy
makers may wish to protect such individuals as they protect employees
who do not retain entrepreneurial discretion, whether to do so
presents a separate policy issue.
As suggested above,69 the Court’s application of its federal common-law formulation in Community for Creative Non-Violence fits well the
“entrepreneurial control” approach taken by section 1.01 because of
its emphasis on the sculptor’s retention of discretion to produce the
commissioned sculpture at a time and in a manner that served his
independent interests. The Court could provide further support for
this approach by joining the several Courts of Appeals70 that have accepted the NLRB’s stress on the presence or absence of “entrepreneurial opportunity” in determining employee status71 under
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).72 The NLRA offers protection to engage or refrain from engaging in collective bargaining or
other concerted activity only to employees.73 It does not affirmatively
prevents the individual from rendering those services as an independent businessperson.
(b) An individual renders services as an independent businessperson
and not as an employee when the individual in his or her own interest
exercises entrepreneurial control over important business decisions,
including whether to hire and where to assign assistants, whether to
purchase and where to deploy equipment, and whether and when to
provide service to other customers.
Id. § 1.01.
69
See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text.
70
See, e.g., NLRB v. Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The
ability to operate an independent business and develop entrepreneurial opportunities is
significant in any analysis of whether an individual is an ‘employee’ or an ‘independent
contractor’ under the common law agency test.”); Corp. Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292
F.3d 777, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (upholding the “Board’s decision . . . to focus not upon the
employer’s control of the means and manner of the work but instead upon whether the
putative independent contractors have a ‘significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain
or loss’” (quoting Corp. Express Delivery Sys., 332 N.L.R.B. 1522, 1522 (2000))).
71
The seminal Board cases setting forth this doctrine are Dial-A-Mattress Operating Co.,
326 N.L.R.B. 884 (1998) (finding independent-contractor status) and Roadway Package Sys.,
Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 842 (1998) (finding employee status). See also, e.g., St. Joseph News-Press,
345 N.L.R.B. 474, 479 (2005) (finding newspaper deliverers were like drivers in Dial-AMattress who could “impact their own income, thereby demonstrating the entrepreneurial
nature of their employment”); Corp. Express Delivery Sys., 332 N.L.R.B. at 1522 (showing that
“owner-operators are employees” as they have no “significant opportunity for entrepreneurial gain or loss”).
72
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012).
73
See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
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define “employee,” but expressly excludes from protection as an employee “any individual having the status of an independent contractor,”74 a phrase it also does not define. Congress added the express
exclusion of independent contractors “to demonstrate that the usual
common-law principles were the keys to [the] meaning” of employee,75 after the Court had first defined it more broadly “in the light
of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained” by the
NLRA.76 Since the addition of the exclusion, therefore, the general
federal common-law distinction of employees from independent contractors is to apply to the NLRA.77 The NLRB, whose administrative
decisions are reviewed by the courts of appeals,78 serves the role of a
lower adjudicatory tribunal in the common-law-making process. As
part of the federal general common-law-making process, the Supreme
Court and the courts of appeals may consider the NLRB’s rationale
for treating hired parties as included employees or excluded independent contractors.79
A decision of a panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reviewing the NLRB’s treatment of FedEx delivery
drivers as employees80 demonstrates how a federal court, and ultimately the Supreme Court, could influence the general common-law
distinction of independent contractors. The majority on the panel
lauded the NLRB’s shift of emphasis “away from the unwieldy control
74

Id. § 152(3).
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 325 (1992).
76
NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 124 (1944) (quoting S. Chicago Coal &
Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 259 (1940)).
77
The Court accepted this application in NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254
(1968).
78
See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)–(f) (2012) (detailing the power to petition the courts of
appeals to enforce NLRB orders and to seek review of NLRB orders in the courts of
appeals).
79
Courts are to review NLRB law making in formal adjudicatory decisions under the
deferential standards set forth in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). See generally Michael C. Harper, Judicial Control of the National
Labor Relations Board’s Lawmaking in the Age of Chevron and Brand X, 89 B.U. L. REV. 189,
203–04 (2009) (explaining that an “interpretation . . . arrived at after . . . a formal adjudication . . . warrant[s] Chevron-style deference”). However, the Court’s determination in
NLRB v. United Insurance Company of America, that Congress intended the NLRB to “apply
general agency principles in distinguishing between employees and independent contractors,” places the distinction of independent contractors outside the Board’s discretion and
expertise. 390 U.S. at 256; see also NLRB v. Friendly Cab Co., Inc., 512 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th
Cir. 2008) (“[T]he NLRB’s decision cannot be upheld if its ‘application of the law to the
facts overlooked accepted principles of the law of agency. . . . This is because ‘a determination of pure agency law involve[s] no special administrative expertise that a court does not
possess’” (quoting United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. at 260)). Further, the Court’s suggestion in Community for Creative Non-Violence and Darden that a general federal common-law
default rule should govern the definition of employee under all federal statutes seems to
indicate that NLRB doctrine that accurately captures this definition for the NLRA should
also capture the doctrine for other federal laws.
80
FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 504 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
75
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inquiry in favor of a more accurate proxy” of whether there is “significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss.”81 The court asserted that “while all the considerations at common law remain in
play, an important animating principle by which to evaluate those factors in cases where some factors cut one way and some the other is
whether the position presents the opportunities and risks inherent in
entrepreneurialism.”82 The court proceeded with that evaluation,
finding the drivers’ entrepreneurial status to be supported by their
right to assign their routes to others without FedEx approval, by their
ownership of and authority to use their trucks for other purposes
when not required to be in use for FedEx, by FedEx’s allowance of
multiple routes, and by the drivers’ authority to hire and negotiate the
pay and benefits of subordinate and substitute drivers.83
The court’s conclusion that the FedEx drivers did retain significant entrepreneurial opportunities may have confused the drivers’
theoretical opportunities with the actual reality of their status. The
court’s conclusion conflicted with the factual findings of the NLRB’s
Regional Director that the drivers actually had little opportunity to
influence their income from FedEx through entrepreneurial ingenuity because the terminal manager determined how many deliveries
they made, FedEx could reconfigure their routes unilaterally, and
FedEx shielded the drivers from loss from unexpected expenses such
as truck repairs and fuel price increases by means of special payments.84 Moreover, the Regional Director had excluded the few multiroute drivers from coverage, no drivers seemed to use their trucks,
which had to carry large FedEx logos, for other business purposes, few
seemed ever to hire their own substitute drivers, and none seemed to
have been able to sell routes for a profit given FedEx’s reconfiguration of old routes and grant of new routes without charge.85 Right or
wrong, however, the decision turned on the entrepreneurial opportunity formulation of the common-law test.86 As Judge Merrick B. Garland argued in his dissent,87 applying a traditionally framed right-tocontrol common-law test would have required the court to take into
account facts reflecting the company’s close control of the drivers’
81
Id. at 497 (quoting Corporate Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 780
(D.C. Cir. 2002)).
82
Id. See also the court’s assertion that it has “retained the common law test (as is
required by the Court’s decision in United Insurance), but merely ‘shift[ed our] emphasis to
entrepreneurialism,’ using this ‘emphasis’ to evaluate common-law factors such as whether
the contractor ‘supplies his own equipment.’” Id. at 503.
83
Id. at 498–500.
84
FedEx Home Delivery, Nos. 1-RC-22034, 1-RC-22035, 2006 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec.
LEXIS 264 at *56–57 (Sept. 20, 2006).
85
FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 504, 512–16 (Garland, J., dissenting).
86
Id. at 510.
87
Id. at 510–12.
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actual service, and thus would have supported a finding of employee
status.88 The panel’s embrace of the NLRB’s entrepreneurial-opportunity emphasis, even in a decision reversing the NLRB, demonstrates
how reformulation of federal common-law doctrine potentially could
influence the general development of the common law of agency.
The Court’s willingness to participate in the general commonlaw-making process on the independent contractor issue suggests that
such a reformulation, perhaps through adoption of a test like that
articulated in section 1.01 of the Restatement of Employment Law is
possible. Supreme Court acceptance of an entrepreneurial-control
test as a refinement of the default federal common-law test for distinguishing employees from independent contractors of course would
not dictate a change in the common-law test chosen by the various
states. However, it could influence state courts that viewed the entrepreneurial-control test as more suited for employment regulation
and more predictable than the open-ended, multifactor right-to-control tests currently cited.89
B. Distinguishing Employer-Agents
The Court already has approved, apparently as general federal
common law, a sharper doctrinal departure from the traditional common-law of agency governing vicarious liability than the entrepreneurial-control or -opportunities test for independent
contractors. Citing Darden for a presumption that Congress intended
a common-law test to govern the meaning of employee under federal
statutes, the Court, in Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v.
Wells,90 held it was “persuaded by the EEOC’s focus on the common
law touchstone of control” to determine “whether a shareholder-direc88

Judge Garland noted that:
the court reject[ed] the import of the following requirements imposed by
FedEx: that drivers wear a recognizable uniform; that vehicles be of a particular color and size range; that trucks display the FedEx logo in a size
larger than Department of Transportation regulations require; that drivers
complete a driving course if they do not have prior training; that drivers
submit to two customer service rides per year to audit their performance;
and that a truck and driver be available for deliveries every Tuesday
through Saturday.
Id. at 511.
89
At least one state court has directly considered the Board’s “entrepreneurial opportunity” test in making a determination of whether delivery drivers were employees or
rather independent contractors under a state employment regulatory statute. See Estrada
v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327, 337 (Ct. App. 2007) (drivers were
employees in part because they were “not engaged in a separate profession or business”
and were not given a “true entrepreneurial opportunity”). The Estrada court seems to have
assumed California state law and federal law were both relevant to a general common-law
definition of employee, as it took into account and distinguished federal cases, including
those reviewing NLRB decisions. See id. at 337 n.11.
90
538 U.S. 440, 444–47 (2003).
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tor is an employee”91 or rather an employer for purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).92 The shareholder-directors
in Clackamas were “four physicians actively engaged in medical practice” in a “professional corporation.”93 If the physicians were not employees of the corporation, not only would they not be protected by
the ADA, but also their professional corporation would not employ
the minimum number of employees necessary to satisfy the conditions
for ADA coverage,94 and a discharged bookkeeper could not make
her ADA claim of disability discrimination.
Agreeing with the approach taken in the EEOC’s Compliance
Manual, the Court asserted that the common-law right-to-control test
for distinguishing independent contractors also should be the basis
for answering the “question of when partners, officers, members of
boards of directors, and major shareholders qualify as employees.”95
The Court also expressed agreement with six specific factors listed in
the EEOC’s Compliance Manual. Each of these factors is relevant to
whether the disputed individuals have sufficient control of the business or part of the business to make decisions in their own economic
interests free of control or supervision of others.96 After briefly
91

Id. at 449.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (1990). The definition of the term employee in the
ADA, like the definition in ERISA, is circular: an “employee” under the ADA is “an individual employed by an employer.” Id. § 12111(4).
93
538 U.S. at 442.
94
Section 101(5) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5), defines a covered employer as “a
person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for
each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.”
95
Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 448. The Court did not give deference under Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to the EEOC’s Compliance Manual. See id. at 449. The Court’s failure to cite Chevron was consistent with the
Court’s later explanation that “[d]eference in accordance with Chevron . . . is warranted
only ‘when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make
rules carrying the force of law.” Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255 (2006) (quoting
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001)). Although the EEOC does have
authority to promulgate formal legislative rules interpreting the ADA, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 12116, the Compliance Manual was not promulgated pursuant to that authority. In review of the Manual, the Clackamas Court thus instead relied on Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S.
134, 140 (1944), an older precedent requiring only consideration of the agency’s “power
to persuade.” See 538 U.S. at 449.
96
The six factors are:
Whether the organization can hire or fire the individual or set the rules
and regulations of the individual’s work
Whether and, if so, to what extent the organization supervises the individual’s work
Whether the individual reports to someone higher in the organization
Whether and, if so, to what extent the individual be an employee, as expressed in written agreements or contracts
Whether the parties intended that the individual is able to influence the
organization
92
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discussing the facts of the case, the Court remanded for application of
the EEOC’s standard.97
The EEOC approach approved by the Court in Clackamas is not
that taken by the traditional common law to determine corporate liability for the torts of major shareholders serving in executive positions. There is no common-law doctrine exempting corporate
employers from liability for the torts of such shareholders if the torts
are committed in the course of their service and within the terms of
their service to the corporation.98 The Restatement (Second) of
Agency states that
fully employed but highly placed employees of a corporation, such
as presidents and general managers, are not less servants because
they are not controlled in their day-to-day work by other human
beings. Their physical activities are controlled by their sense of obligation to devote their time and energies to the interests of the
enterprise.99

Modern partnership law also imposes liability on the partnership for
the torts of any partner, committed within the scope of the partner’s
service to the corporation, regardless of the partner’s ownership share
or control of the partnership.100 The Restatement (Second) of
Whether the individual shares in the profits, losses, and liabilities of the
organization.
EEOC Compliance Manual § 605:0009.
Citing its earlier quotation of United Insurance in Darden, see supra notes 60–61, the
Court also iterated that the line dividing employees from employers, like the line dividing
independent contractors, cannot be drawn by the use of a formula or a single set of factors,
and thus agreed with the EEOC that the six factors need not “be treated” as “exhaustive.”
538 U.S. at 450 n.10.
97
538 U.S. at 451. As apparently supportive of employer status, the court cited district-court findings that the doctor-shareholders “control the operation of their clinic, they
share the profits, and they are personally liable for malpractice claims.” Id. In a footnote,
however, the Court also noted that “the record indicates that the four director-shareholders receive salaries, that they must comply with the standards established by the clinic, and
that they report to a personnel manager.” Id. at n.11.
98
Indeed, modern decisions finding no preclusion by a workers’ compensation law
hold corporate employers directly liable for the torts of controlling owners as alter egos of
the corporation, even when the torts are for unauthorized actions outside the scope of
employment. See e.g., Randall v. Tod-Nik Audiology, Inc., 704 N.Y.S.2d 228, 230 (App. Div.
2000) (claims for sexual assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress
may proceed against corporate employer when committed by “proxy” who was president
and fifty percent owner along with wife who owned other fifty percent); Sutton v. Overcash, 623 N.E.2d 820 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (coowner’s sexual harassment could subject employer to tort liability); Woodson v. Rowland, 407 S.E.2d 222, 226 (N.C. 1991) (employer’s
chief executive and sole shareholder’s intentional tort can subject employer to liability).
99
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY ch. 7, topic 2, tit. B, intro. note at 479 (1958);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07, illus. 15 (2006).
100
See, e.g., Wallan v. Rankin, 173 F.2d 488, 490–91 (9th Cir. 1949) (applying Oregon
law); In re Georgou, 145 B.R. 36, 36–37 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) (applying Illinois Partnership Act); Wolfe v. Harms, 413 S.W.2d 204, 215–16 (Mo. 1967); Eule v. Eule Motor Sales,
170 A.2d 241, 243–45 (N.J. 1961); Treon v. Shipman & Son, 119 A.74, 74–75 (Pa. 1922).

R
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Agency states that “[w]hen one of the partners is in active management of the business or is otherwise regularly employed in the business, he is a servant of the partnership.”101
The Court, through its approval of the EEOC’s approach, thus
endorsed a new test for distinguishing employers from employees as a
default rule for federal regulatory employment law. It did so in the
manner of common-law courts which may depart creatively from prior
doctrine without open acknowledgement.102 The Clackamas decision,
moreover, because it draws a sensible line, potentially can be influential in jurisdictions other than the federal jurisdiction it controls. The
independent contractor “right-to-control” test, especially if refined to
an entrepreneurial-control or -opportunities test, can be effectively
adapted to a test for distinguishing employers from employees. Individuals who can exercise entrepreneurial control over all or part of an
enterprise in their own interest are not in the same need of regulatory
protection as are the employees treated as “servants” under the common law. Both shareholders with controlling interests in corporations
and partners who control at least part of the operations of a partnership have such discretion. Rather than ultimately being controlled,
they exercise control.
The Restatement of Employment Law also could support the
proliferation of the Clackamas-EEOC approach. Section 1.03 of this
Restatement states that “[u]nless otherwise provided by law, an individual is not an employee of an enterprise if the individual through an
ownership interest controls all or a significant part of the enterprise.”103 This section, like section 1.01’s definition of the line distinguishing independent contractors, provides an ultimate focus for a
multifactor test. Elaborating the Clackamas-EEOC approach, section
1.03 requires the exclusion of individuals as employers to be based on
the individuals’ ownership of the employing enterprise.104 Even a
chief executive of a publicly held corporation is a protected employee
of that corporation, subject to the control of the owners through a
101
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14A cmt. a (1958); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.16, cmt. b (2006) (stating that partnership legislation providing for
joint and several liability for partnership obligations is based on “each partner [being] an
agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business”). The comment cites section 301
of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (1997).
102
K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 72–73 (1960); Levi, supra note 19, at 501;
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 4–7 (Harv. Univ. Press 1988).
103
RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 1.03 (2015).
104
The EEOC Compliance Manual, see supra note 96, does not directly require that
anyone excluded from employee status as an employer exercise control through ownership. Only the sixth factor directly focuses on ownership rather than control. However,
anyone who is not a controlling owner is at least potentially subject to being terminated
and constrained by corporate rules and regulations, as highlighted by the first of the
factors.

R

R
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Board of Directors, unless the chief executive is also a controlling
owner.105 Section 1.03 also clarifies that having a noncontrolling equitable stake in an enterprise, even one that includes a minority vote,
does not exclude an individual who provides remunerated service to
an enterprise from the class of employees protected by economic regulatory laws.106 To be excluded as a controlling owner, whether as a
corporate shareholder or as a partner, an individual must have sufficient ownership to control a significant part of the enterprise. Section
1.03 thus clarifies that the Clackamas doctors would be excluded employers, rather than employees of their professional corporation, if
each of the four, free of the control of the other three or their managerial delegate, could make significant decisions about his own practice, such as the allocation of his time, the hiring or use of assistants,
and the identity of patients, which would determine his ultimate remuneration. The Clackamas doctors, however, all would be employees
if each were subject to the control of a manager or a specific set of
guidelines that constrained their making independent business decisions about their own practice that could ultimately determine their
remuneration.
Not surprisingly, the Clackamas decision already has proved influential, not only in federal courts interpreting federal statutes, but also
in courts interpreting state statutes. Federal courts have applied the
Clackamas-EEOC method for distinguishing employers from the employees covered by the other federal employment antidiscrimination
statutes under the aegis of the EEOC.107 Federal courts also cite it as
relevant precedent for determining employee status under other federal statutes;108 in at least one case a court did so to exclude an indi105

See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 1.03 cmt. b (2015).
See id. cmt. a.
107
See, e.g., Mariotti v. Mariotti Bldg. Prods., Inc., 714 F.3d 761, 768 (3d Cir. 2013)
(religious discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act); Kirleis v. Dickie,
McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., No. 09-4498, 2010 WL 2780927, at *1–2 (3d Cir. July 15, 2010)
(sex discrimination under Title VII and Equal Pay Act); Smith v. Castaways Family Diner,
453 F.3d 971, 975–87 (7th Cir. 2006) (sex, race, and national-origin discrimination under
Title VII); Solon v. Kaplan, 398 F.3d 629, 632–33 (7th Cir. 2005) (retaliation under Title
VII); Bowers v. Ophthalmology Grp., LLP, No. 5:12–CV–00034–JHM, 2012 WL 3637529, at
*3–6 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 22, 2012) (sex discrimination under Title VII); Simms v. Ctr. for Corr.
Health & Policy Studies, 794 F. Supp. 2d 173, 189–90 (D.D.C. 2011) (sexual harassment
under Title VII); Puckett v. McPhillips Shinbaum, No. 2:06–CV–1148–ID, 2010 WL
17929104, at *6 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 30, 2010) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
108
See, e.g., Steelman v. Hirsch, 473 F.3d 124, 129–30 (4th Cir. 2007) (plaintiff not an
employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act because she worked to share in the future
success of business rather than for current compensation); Trustees of N.E.C.A.—IBEW
Local 176 Health, Welfare, Pension, Vacation, and Training Trust Funds v. CM Mgmt.
Servs. Co., No. 07 CV 2120, 2009 WL 590310, at *4 & n.10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2009) (finding
employee status for protection by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act); Bell
v. Atl. Trucking Co., No. 3:09-cv-406-J-32MCR, 2009 WL 4730564, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 7,
2009) (citing Clackamas as common-law precedent for employee status under exemption
106
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vidual from coverage under the EEOC test.109 Several state courts also
have found Clackamas to be relevant as a common-law precedent for
the interpretation of state antidiscrimination or other employee-protection statutes.110
One of these state-court decisions, Feldman v. Hunterdon Radiological Associates,111 rendered by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, highlights how the Supreme Court currently may play the same role of
persuasion and influence over state law that was envisaged for federal
courts in the Swift v. Tyson era. The issue in Feldman was whether a
physician-radiologist and shareholder-director of a professional corporation was an employee protected by the state’s Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA).112 As explained by the court, “CEPA
was enacted in 1986 in response” to one of the New Jersey Supreme
Court’s prior decisions, which had recognized “a common-law cause
of action for at-will ‘employees’ for wrongful discharge when the discharge is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy.”113 CEPA codified that cause of action, in part by providing specific definitions of
employee actions protected from employer retaliation, including objection to the “improper quality of patient care” of a “licensed . . . health care professional.”114 Dr. Feldman claimed she was
constructively discharged by hostility from the other shareholder-directors because of her strong objections to the “deficiencies” in the
care provided by one of these fellow shareholder-director-doctors.115
The court held, however, that her claim stated a cause of action under
CEPA only if she was an employee of the professional corporation; to
determine whether she was, it would “adopt the approach formulated
from Federal Arbitration Act); Nichols v. All Points Transp. Corp. of Mich., Inc., 364 F.
Supp. 2d 621, 629 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (citing Clackamas as common-law precedent for employee status under Family Medical Leave Act).
109
See Pearl v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 289 F. Supp. 2d 324, 328 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (plaintiff surgeon who supervised own work, reported to no supervisor, and was coequal owner of
enterprise with two other doctors was not an employee under Employment Retirement
Income Security Act).
110
See, e.g., Madigan v. Webber Hosp. Ass’n, No. 2:11–cv–00094–JAW, 2012 WL
4510958, at *16–17 (D. Me. Sept. 28, 2012) (Maine antidiscrimination statute); Kirleis, 2010
WL 2780927, at *1–2 (Pennsylvania antidiscrimination statute); Imperato v. S. Cal.
Permanente Med. Grp., No. B190769, 2007 WL 1979041, at *3–5 (Cal. Ct. App. July 10,
2007) (California Fair Employment and Housing Act); Theroux v. Stephen Singer, DDS,
PC, No. 200500764, 2006 WL 1745788, at *4–7 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2006) (Massachusetts employment-discrimination law); Hopkins v. Duckett, 2012 WL 124842, at *9 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 17, 2012) (New Jersey antidiscrimination statute); Compton-Williams v. Kuramo Capital Mgmt., LLC, No. 483/12, 2012 WL 2942595, at *2–4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 21, 2012) (New York state and city antidiscrimination statutes).
111
901 A.2d 322 (N.J. 2006).
112
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-1 to -8 (West 2011).
113
Feldman, 901 A.2d at 328 (citing Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505
(1980)).
114
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3(c)(1).
115
Feldman, 901 A.2d at 324.
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by the United States Supreme Court in Clackamas.”116 The Feldman
court recognized that the Court in Clackamas for purposes of considering controlling shareholder-directors had “ultimately modulated” the
common-law test “drawn from section 220 of the Restatement
(Second) of Agency” for independent contractors.117 Nonetheless,
the Feldman court embraced this “holistic approach to the question of
a shareholder-director’s employee status” for the CEPA118 and, finding Feldman’s position and power on the professional corporation’s
Board of Directors to be “at least equal to that of the other shareholders-directors,”119 held she was not a protected employee.120
The Feldman court’s adoption of the Clackamas “approach” did
not dictate the result in the case. Given the Clackamas Court’s decision to remand rather than itself apply the EEOC factors,121 Clackamas
can be read, more in line with the Restatement of Employment Law to
make critical, not whether a shareholder-director (or partner) has at
least equal influence as any other shareholder-director (or partner),
but rather whether any shareholder-director has independent discretion to operate at least part of the business in her own economic interest free of the collective control of the others. Dr. Feldman
apparently did not retain such discretion; each doctor had to practice
medicine only for the corporation and only under the rules and regulations of the corporation, including those determining the patients
to be served and the fees to be charged and exclusively assigned to the
corporation.122 Any influence Dr. Feldman had over the corporation
depended upon her influence over the collectivity of the other doctors, and, like each of the other doctors, she was subject in all respects
to the collectivity’s authority.123 If out of favor because of protected
whistleblowing activity, Dr. Feldman was as vulnerable to discharge
and other mistreatment by that collectivity as would be any senior
manager by the collective power of a supervisory board.
Nevertheless, the Feldman court’s acceptance of the Clackamas decision as the guiding light for New Jersey’s wrongful discharge law
demonstrates well how the Supreme Court’s federal law-making authority can contribute to the development of a general common law
in the age of Erie and a matrix of federal and state statutes.124 Indeed,
116

Id.
Id. at 331.
118
Id. at 334.
119
Id. at 335.
120
Id. at 335–36.
121
538 U.S. 440, 451 (2003).
122
Feldman, 901 A.2d at 324–26.
123
Id. at 335.
124
Clackamas, especially as refined in section 1.03 of the Restatement of Employment
Law, also might assist state courts in their interpretation of their jurisdiction’s workers’
compensation statute. Such statutes often exempt from their exclusive coverage assaults
117
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the application of the Clackamas approach to a state statute intended
to codify a development in the state’s common law suggests that the
Clackamas “modulation” of common law also could directly influence
a state’s noncodified common law as well. A creative adaption of common-law doctrine for purposes of serving the goals and balance of a
federal statute also can provide a persuasive model for developments
in the common law of state jurisdictions.125
II
VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR
TORTS OF SUPERVISORS

THE

The Court in Clackamas did not acknowledge that its adoption of
common-law doctrine was a departure from the traditional general
common law. In other significant employment-law decisions, however, the Court has openly acknowledged its creative reformulation of
the general common law of agency after assuming Congress intended
common law to guide the interpretation of a statute. Most significantly, in two separate decisions released the same day126 and proand other intentional torts committed directly by a human employer or by an “alter ego” of
a legal-entity employer, such as a corporation. See 6 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS
COMPENSATION LAW § 103.01 (Matthew Bender ed., 2011). The controlling-owner formulation of section 1.03 could provide a meaningful standard to capture how the states generally have defined and reasonably should define “alter ego.” Compare, e.g., Magliulo v.
Superior Court, 121 Cal. Rptr. 621, 635–37 (Ct. App. 1975) (workers’ compensation remedy not exclusive of tort claim where assaulter of injured employee was coowner and partner), Randall v. Tod-Nik Audiology, Inc., 704 N.Y.S.2d 228, 229–30 (App. Div. 2000)
(claims for sexual assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress may proceed against corporate employer when committed by possible “proxy” who was president
and fifty percent owner along with wife who owned other fifty percent), and Woodson v.
Rowland, 407 S.E.2d 222, 228 (N.C. 1991) (conduct of employer’s chief executive and sole
shareholder that is “tantamount to an intentional tort” can subject employer to liability),
with, e.g., Peterson v. RTM Mid-America, Inc., 434 S.E.2d 521, 525 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993)
(manager of restaurant not an alter ego because not in a position of ownership or control),
Eichstadt v. Frisch’s Rests., Inc., 879 N.E.2d 1207, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (employee
must show that both ownership and control of the corporation are in the hands of the
tortfeasor), Daniels v. Swofford, 286 S.E.2d 582, 585 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (company president who kicked employee in leg not an alter ego), McClain v. Pactiv Corp., 602 S.E.2d 87,
89 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004) (managers who were not “dominant” corporate owners or officers
are not alter egos of corporate employer), Benson v. Goble, 593 N.W.2d 402, 406 (S.D.
1999) (to qualify as alter ego, employee must be “so dominant in the corporation that he
could be deemed” to be the employer under the general standard for disregarding a corporate entity). See also RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 4.01 cmt. b (2015) (noting the consistency between state and federal retaliation protections and the Restatement’s approach to
discharges in violation of public policy).
125
For other examples outside employment law of Supreme Court decisions that
could influence state common-law doctrine through what arguably were “modulations” of
the common law in its application to the interpretation of a federal statute, see the Court’s
decisions in Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 402 (2003), and Evans v.
United States, 504 U.S. 255, 259 (1992); see also supra note 10.
126
See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
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nouncing the exact same paragraph-long “holding,”127 the Court
announced new doctrine to determine employer liability under Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act128 for discriminatory harassment of
employees by supervisors.129 This new doctrine, although controlling
only for Title VII and presumably other federal anti-employment-discrimination statutes,130 potentially could have a significant and salutary effect on how states resolve a range of vicarious liability issues
under their common law. The same policy arguments that supported
the Court’s articulation of new doctrine for Title VII can apply to determining when employers should be liable for the common law torts
of employees committed outside the scope of employment but
127

Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012).
129
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an
actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or
successively higher) authority over the employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative
defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the
evidence, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c). The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent
and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive
or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. While proof that an employer had promulgated an antiharassment
policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the first
element of the defense. And while proof that an employee failed to fulfill
the corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing an unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure
provided by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally
suffice to satisfy the employer’s burden under the second element of the
defense. No affirmative defense is available, however, when the supervisor’s
harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge,
demotion, or undesirable reassignment.
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
130
The lower courts and the EEOC have interpreted the decisions to apply to all forms
of discriminatory harassment covered by Title VII, not just the sexual harassment at issue
in those cases. See, e.g., Kang v. U. Lim Am., Inc., 296 F.3d 810, 817 (9th Cir. 2002) (national-origin discrimination); Wright-Simmons v. City of Ok. City, 155 F.3d 1264, 1270
(10th Cir. 1998) (race); see also EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (June 18, 1999)
[hereinafter EEOC, Enforcement Guidance] (stating that Ellerth and Faragher apply to all
forms of Title VII-proscribed discriminatory harassment). The lower courts and the EEOC
also have applied the decisions to antidiscrimination statutes other than Title VII. See, e.g.,
Williams v. Admin. Review Bd., 376 F.3d 471, 478 (5th Cir. 2004) (whistleblower protection
provision of Energy Reorganization Act of 1974); Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties,
Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 72 (2d Cir. 2000) (42 U.S.C. § 1981 racial-harassment claim); Breeding v.
Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1158 (8th Cir. 1999) (Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) claim as well as sex-discrimination claim); Wallin v. Minn. Dep’t
of Corr., 153 F.3d 681, 688 n.7 (8th Cir. 1998) (dicta) (Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA)); EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra (holding applies to harassment based on age
under ADEA and disability under ADA as well as Title VII claims).
128
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through the use of special opportunities provided to the wrong-doing
employee by the employer.131
The Court’s two path-breaking decisions on employer liability
under Title VII, Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,132 and Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton,133 followed an earlier decision, Meritor Savings Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, which had stated “Congress wanted courts to look to
agency principles for guidance in this area.”134 Twelve years later the
Court considered that guidance in the Ellerth and Faragher opinions.
The two cases were not treated as companions, but were instead argued separately and were assigned after argument to two different Justices for majority opinions. The reason for the separate argument and
opinions was that the Court did not grant certiorari in Ellerth on the
issue of employer liability for supervisory “hostile work environment”
harassment like the sexual propositions, comments, and touching
proven in Faragher;135 but did so rather to decide whether the harassment alleged in Ellerth, unfulfilled threats by a supervisor to take retaliatory action against a subordinate who did not respond to sexual
overtures,136 should be classified as “quid pro quo” rather than “hostile
work environment” harassment.137 That may have seemed an important issue because the per curiam en banc Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals decision appealed in Ellerth138 accepted the liability doctrine
that had been adopted post-Meritor in most circuits—employers are
vicariously liable for quid pro quo harassment, but are liable for
131
132
133
134

See infra text accompanying notes 203–08.
524 U.S. 742 (1998).
524 U.S. 777 (1998).
477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). The Court also stated that:
While such common-law principles may not be transferable in all their particulars to Title VII, Congress’ decision to define “employer” to include any
“agent” of an employer, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), surely evinces an intent to
place some limits on the acts of employees for which employers under Title
VII are to be held responsible.

Id.
135
For a recounting of the tawdry facts found by the Court after a bench trial in
Faragher, see 524 U.S. at 780–83.
136
For the alleged facts considered on a motion for summary judgment in Ellerth, see
524 U.S. at 747–49.
137
The precise question on which certiorari was granted was:
Whether a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment may be stated under
Title VII . . . where the plaintiff employee has neither submitted to the
sexual advances of the alleged harasser nor suffered any tangible effects on
the compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment as a consequence of a refusal to submit to those advances?
Id. at 753. As stated by the Court in Ellerth, cases based on “carried out” threats to retaliate
if “sexual liberties” are “denied” “are referred to often as quid pro quo cases.” Id. at 751.
138
Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc). The
Ellerth case was consolidated with another case involving unfulfilled threats for purposes of
en banc consideration.

R
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hostile work environment harassment, including that of supervisors,
only if they are negligent in their control of the workplace.139
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Ellerth, however, recognizes that the distinction of quid pro quo from hostile work
environment harassment is not expressed in the statute140 and, more
importantly, the ultimate relevance of any possible distinction depends on the rules governing employer liability: “The question
presented on certiorari is whether Ellerth can state a claim of quid
pro quo harassment, but the issue of real concern to the parties is
whether Burlington has vicarious liability for [the supervisor’s] alleged misconduct, rather than liability limited to its own negligence.”141 Thus, it must have been clear both to Justice Kennedy and
Justice David Souter, who wrote the majority opinion in Faragher, that
the same rules on employer liability must govern both cases, whether
or not these rules generate the same results.142 Because neither Justice apparently wanted to defer to the other’s opinion, we have two
separate analyses of the general common law of agency leading to the
same reformulation of that law to govern employer vicarious liability
for discriminatory harassment actionable under Title VII.
The analysis of employer liability in each opinion attempts to
reach its conclusion through an interpretation of general common
law as expressed in section 219 of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency. Revealingly, neither opinion directly acknowledges the suggestion of Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, set forth in his dissent from
the Court of Appeals decision reviewed in Ellerth, that the agency law
of the state where the harassment occurred, not some constructed
general common law, should govern.143 Justice Kennedy, quoting
Reid, instead stated that the Court must “rely ‘on the general common
law of agency, rather than on the law of any particular State, to give

139

See id. at 495.
524 U.S. at 752. Justice Kennedy allowed that the Court in Meritor had “distinguished between quid pro quo claims and hostile environment claims,” but asserted it did so
“to instruct that Title VII is violated by either explicit or constructive alterations in the
terms or conditions of employment and to explain the latter must be severe or pervasive.”
Id.
141
Id. at 753.
142
For a fuller account of the background of the two cases, including the oral arguments, see Michael C. Harper & Joan Flynn, The Story of Burlington Industries v. Ellerth and
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton: Federal Common Lawmaking for the Modern Age, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 225 (Joel Wm. Friedman ed., 2006).
143
Jansen, 123 F.3d at 554–56 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). In her own concurring opinion, Judge Diane P. Wood also advocated the use of the
state common law of agency, in part because of the concerns with vertical uniformity underlying the Erie Court’s rejection of federal common law. See id. at 571 (Wood, J., concurring and dissenting).
140
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meaning to these terms,’”144 and focused on the Restatement
(Second) of Agency as “a useful beginning point for a discussion of
general agency principles.”145
Justice Souter began his analysis in his Faragher opinion by
parsing the language of section 219 of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency,146 and considered the precedents citing that language as if he
were engaged in an endeavor, jointly with other courts, to find meaning in that section’s general statement of the law.147 Justice Souter
considered whether the principle, as expressed in section 219(1), that
an employer or “master” is “subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment”
might be interpreted free of the traditional limitation, expressed in
section 228(1), that to be within the scope of employment, the tort
must be “actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the
master.”148 This was significant because in Faragher the apparent supervisors’ pervasive sexual propositions, posturing, and touching
clearly were not “actuated” to serve the City of Boca Raton.149 Justice
Souter’s consideration included a citation of numerous decisions
from various jurisdictions applying common law to treat within the
scope of employment reasonably foreseeable activity related to employment duties even when not motivated to serve the employer.150
Though he ultimately declined to rest his analysis on a broad interpretation of “scope of employment,” in part because doing so would also
create vicarious employer liability for coworker harassment,151 Justice
Souter suggested that these common-law cases might justify making
non-negligent employers liable for actionable discriminatory
144
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754–55 (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490
U.S. 730, 740 (1989)). Justice Kennedy also was careful to acknowledge that “[t]his is not
federal common law in ‘the strictest sense . . . that amounts, not simply to an interpretation
of a federal statute . . . , but, rather, to the judicial ‘creation’ of a special federal rule of
decision.’” Id. at 755 (quoting Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997)).
145
Id. at 755.
146
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958).
147
See Faragher, 524 U.S. 777, 793–96 (1998).
148
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(1) (1958); see 524 U.S. at 793.
149
The supervisors who harassed Faragher could not have thought that any of their
harassment, see Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780–83, advanced the interests of the City of Boca
Raton.
150
Id. at 794–95. These cases included Judge Friendly’s often cited, but questionable,
decision in Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968), finding
the government vicariously liable for the damage caused by a drunken sailor’s flooding of a
dry dock by opening valves for no possible constructive purpose.
151
See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799. Justice Souter stressed that the lower courts had “uniformly judg[ed] employer liability for co-worker harassment under a negligence standard.”
Id. Justice Souter also allowed “there is no reason to suppose that Congress wished courts
to ignore the traditional distinction between acts falling within the scope and acts amounting to what the older law called frolics or detours from the course of employment.” Id. at
798.
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harassment “as one of the costs of doing business, to be charged to the
enterprise rather than the victim.”152
Justice Kennedy in his Ellerth opinion also considered section
219(1) and acknowledged “instances . . . where a supervisor engages
in unlawful discrimination with the purpose, mistaken or otherwise, to
serve the employer”; he recognized that the “concept of scope of employment has not always been construed to require a motive to serve
the employer.”153 Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy quickly dismissed the
concept as a basis for a Title VII liability rule154 in favor of an attempt
to formulate a new rule based on section 219(2)(d).155 This latter
section provides for employer vicarious liability where the employee
“purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was
reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing
the tort by the existence of the agency relation.”156 Justice Kennedy
interpreted the phrase after the comma to stand independent of the
phrase before “and,” so that the phrase could apply to the use of an
“agency relation” in the absence of a supervisor purporting to act on
behalf of an employer.157 He then limited this broad interpretation
by asserting it requires something more than an employment relationship that affords the “[p]roximity and regular contact” of a
coworker.158 Justice Kennedy further pressed his interpretation of the
last phrase in section 219(2)(d) by asserting, without any direct precedential support, that the phrase is the basis for finding employers liable—presumably not only under Title VII, but also under other law—
for supervisors taking what he called “tangible” employment actions,
such as a discharge or denial of a raise or a promotion, against
152

Id. at 798.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 757 (1998).
154
“The general rule is that sexual harassment by a supervisor is not conduct within
the scope of employment.” Id.
155
Id. at 758–59.
156
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958).
157
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759–60. This may have misconstrued what section 219(2)(d) was
intended to mean. The interpretation renders the scope-of-employment limitation largely
nugatory, or at least superfluous, because almost all torts resulting from the employment
relationship are “aided” by the existence of that relationship, regardless of the tortfeasor’s
independent course of conduct and motivation for committing the torts. The illustrations
in comment e to section 219 clarify that the “aided . . . by the existence of the agency
relation” clause, like the apparent authority clause, was meant to qualify “purported to act
or to speak on behalf of the principal.” Those illustrations indicate that the tortfeasing
employee must claim to be speaking or acting with authority delegated from some principal. In comment a to section 228 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, the placement of
the comma after “principal” makes this intent more clear: “a master may be liable if a
servant speaks or acts, purporting to do so on behalf of his principal, and there is reliance
upon his apparent authority or he is aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of
the agency relation.” See Paula J. Dalley, All in a Day’s Work: Employers’ Vicarious Liability for
Sexual Harassment, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 517, 550–51 (2002) (critiquing the Court’s interpretation of section 219(2)(d) on similar grounds).
158
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760.
153
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subordinates.159 Justice Kennedy offered two, not fully consistent,
ways of defining “tangible,” one resting on whether it entails a “significant change in employment status”160 and the other requiring “an official act of the enterprise, a company act,” which “in most cases is
documented in official company records, and may be subject to review
by higher level supervisors.”161 Justice Kennedy, however, was not
able to explain how the “aided in the agency relation standard” derived from the general common law expressed in section 219(2)(d)
could determine whether there should be employer liability in cases
that do not include tangible employment actions.162
After setting aside a broad interpretation of the scope of employment standard in his Faragher opinion, Justice Souter agreed with
Justice Kennedy’s treatment of the last phrase in section 219(2)(d) as
an independent standard that “provides an appropriate starting point
for determining liability” for discriminatory harassment.163 Justice
Souter, however, also did not find the standard to be satisfactory
standing alone to determine employer liability under Title VII for a
supervisor’s misuse of authority. Justice Souter asserted that while a
harassing supervisor may always be assisted in his misconduct to some
159
Id. This new interpretation of the “aided in the agency relation” phrase was unnecessary to explain why employers are always liable for formal employment decisions, such as
discharges and demotions, made by agents with delegated authority to make those decisions in behalf of the employer. Most employers in the modern economy are legal entities,
such as corporations, that act only through human agents with delegated authority to act
for the entity. As reiterated in section 7.04 of the Restatement (Third) of Agency, the
common law has provided that a “principal is subject to liability to a third party harmed by
an agent’s [tortious] conduct when the agent’s conduct is within the scope of the agent’s
actual authority.” Furthermore, most discriminatory or retaliatory formal employment decisions also are made within the scope of the decision maker’s employment in part to serve
the employer.
160
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761.
161
Id. at 762. The Court effectively adopted the second definition in its later opinion
in Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004). In Suders, the Court held that the
Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense is available in cases where a supervisor’s harassment
does not include an official act and is not significant or severe enough to satisfy the high
standard for constructive discharge: a showing of working conditions so intolerable as to
warrant a reasonable employee’s resignation. Id. at 134. Quoting from Ellerth, the Suders
Court stressed that whether a decision is tangible turns not on severity, but rather on
whether it is “an official act of the enterprise, a company act.” Id. at 144 (quoting Ellerth,
524 U.S. at 762). “[T]angible employment actions ‘fall within the special province of the
supervisor,’ who ‘has been empowered by the company as . . . [an] agent to make economic decisions affecting other employees under his or her control.’” Id. This definition
encompasses precisely those acts of the agent that are within the agent’s scope of authority.
See supra note 159.
162
In Vance v. Ball State University, 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2448 (2013), the Court nonetheless
cited the Ellerth decision’s distinction of “tangible” employment actions as a basis for limiting the reach of the new vicarious liability it formulated in Ellerth and Faragher. See infra
note 185.
163
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 802 (1998).

R
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degree by his authority over subordinates,164 imposing vicarious liability for all actionable supervisory harassment would be inconsistent
with language in Meritor stating the court of appeals in that case had
“erred in concluding that employers are always automatically liable for
sexual harassment by their supervisors.”165
Both Justices thus felt it necessary to frame a standard for liability
that took into account not only what they could derive from the general common law of agency as expressed in the Restatement (Second)
of Agency, but also Title VII’s “basic policies of encouraging forethought by employers and saving action by objecting employees.”166
The “primary objective” of Title VII, Justice Souter asserted, “like that
of any statute meant to influence primary conduct, is not to provide
redress but to avoid harm.”167 Such avoidance, in Justice Souter’s
view, could be encouraged by tempering the section 219(2)(d) standard with an affirmative defense for employers who could establish
both their own reasonable efforts to avoid discriminatory harassment
of the sort suffered by an aggrieved employee and the employee’s failure to make reasonable efforts to avoid that harassment.168 Justice
Kennedy agreed that Congress’ intention “to encourage the creation
of anti-harassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms” and
Title VII’s deterrence goals supported formulation of a two-pronged
affirmative defense.169 Each opinion thereby could agree with the
same formulation of doctrine:
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee
for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with
immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee.
When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages . . . .
The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. . . . No affirmative defense is available, however, when the

164

Id. at 803–04.
477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986), quoted in Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804. Justice Kennedy, like
Justice Souter, also treated this statement as a holding of Meritor, binding on the Court as
stare decisis. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763–64. For the contrary view that the Meritor decision did
not bind the Court from announcing a rule of strict employer liability for all supervisory
harassment, see Harper & Flynn, supra note 142, at 254–56.
166
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
167
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806.
168
Id. at 806–07.
169
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
165

R
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supervisor’s harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment.170

The fact that this elaborate doctrine, unlike the federal common
law pronounced by the Court in Reid 171 and Clackamas,172 was acknowledged to be only under the “guidance”173 of the general common law and ultimately based on statutory policy, does not render the
doctrine of less potential relevance to a general common-law-making
process involving state as well as federal courts. The Court’s formulation of this doctrine was as much an instance of judicial law making as
the formulation of any doctrine under a federal common-law-making
authority based on broad jurisdictional grants like that of section 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act174 or on an open-ended substantive law like the Sherman Act.175 Indeed, the Court’s creative formulation of a new affirmative defense to strict vicarious liability was as
much an instance of law making as the promulgation of a federal legislative regulation through the formal rulemaking processes required
by section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act.176 The Court
could not and did not pretend it was simply interpreting what Congress had intended by statutory language in Title VII that offered no
more guidance than a definition of employer to include “any
agent.”177
Furthermore, the new federal common law of Faragher and Ellerth
has the same potentially influential but not controlling relation to
state law as did the general common law that was pronounced under
the regime of Swift v. Tyson.178 Federal antidiscrimination employment law assumes rather than preempts the existence of variant state
antidiscrimination law;179 federal law allows the state law to vary as
170
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. For a fuller statement of the
joint “holding” of the cases, see supra note 129.
171
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
172
Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003).
173
See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986); supra note 144 and accompanying text.
174
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2000); see, e.g.,
Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 450–51 (1957) (interpreting jurisdictional grant over suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization to confer authority to create law governing such suits).
175
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012).
176
5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
177
“The term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person . . . .”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012).
178
41 U.S. 1 (1842).
179
The assumption of parallel state regulation of employment discrimination is manifest in Title VII’s procedural system, which requires first filing discrimination charges with
any state or local authority that has a law covering the alleged discrimination. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(c) (2012).

R
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long as it does not directly conflict with federal law by requiring that
which the federal law prohibits.180 State antidiscrimination in
employment law thus may impose either greater or lesser liability on
employers for discriminatory supervisory harassment than that imposed under Faragher and Ellerth. State antidiscrimination law, however, often tracks federal law, with state courts looking to Supreme
Court constructions of federal law for guidance. Thus, numerous
state courts have adopted the Faragher-Ellerth doctrine for state antidiscrimination statutes.181
The influence of Faragher and Ellerth may derive from a compelling policy rationale for qualified strict liability that was not fully developed by either Justice Souter or Justice Kennedy. The Faragher-Ellerth
affirmative defense-qualified employer liability for discriminatory supervisory harassment encourages the reduction of such harassment by
imposing the costs of the harassment on that party that presumably
was in the best position to avoid the harassment at the lowest costs.182
Doing so provides to that party the incentive to weigh the risk-discounted costs of taking particular avoidance measures against the riskdiscounted benefits of those measures. The Faragher-Ellerth doctrine
180
See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281–92 (1987). As the
Court in Guerra stressed, section 708 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7, provides for the
preemption of state laws “only if they actually conflict with federal law,” 479 U.S. at 281, by
purporting “to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under” Title VII, id. at 281–82 (quoting section 708).
181
See, e.g., Bank One, Ky. v. Murphy, 52 S.W.3d 540, 543–44 (Ky. 2001) (Kentucky
antidiscrimination law); Frieler v. Carlson Mktg. Grp., Inc., 751 N.W.2d 558, 568–69
(Minn. 2008) (Minnesota antidiscrimination law); Ocana v. Am. Furniture Co., 91 P.3d 58,
69–70 (N.M. 2004) (New Mexico antidiscrimination law); Brentlinger v. Highlights for
Children, 753 N.E.2d 937, 942–43 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (Ohio antidiscrimination law);
Parker v. Warren Cnty. Util. Dist., 2 S.W.3d 170, 176 (Tenn. 1999) (Tennessee antidiscrimination law); see also State Dep’t of Health Servs. v. Superior Court of Sacramento
Cnty., 79 P.3d 556, 564–65 (Cal. 2003) (adopting variation on Faragher/Ellerth as “avoidable
consequences doctrine” under California Fair Employment and Housing Act); Farmland
Foods, Inc. v. Dubuque Human Rights Comm’n, 672 N.W.2d 733, 744 (Iowa 2003) (dicta;
Iowa city ordinance); Boudreaux v. La. Casino Cruises, Inc., 762 So. 2d 1200, 1204–05 (La.
Ct. App. 2000) (Louisiana’s repealed antidiscrimination law). But see Myrick v. GTE Main
St. Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 94, 98 (D. Mass. 1999) (relying on College-Town v. Mass. Comm’n
Against Discrimination, 508 N.E.2d 587 (Mass. 1987), to hold that under Massachusetts
antidiscrimination law employer is strictly liable for supervisory harassment without
Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense); Chambers v. Trettco, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 910, 917–18
(Mich. 2000) (declining to adopt Faragher/Ellerth for Michigan antidiscrimination law;
plaintiff must prove the employer failed to take prompt and adequate remedial action);
Pollock v. Wetterau Food Distrib. Grp., 11 S.W.3d 754, 767–68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (applying regulation to make employer strictly liable for supervisory harassment under Missouri
law); Zakrzewska v. New Sch., 928 N.E.2d 1035, 1038–39 (N.Y. 2010) (Fargaher/Ellerth affirmative defense not available under Administrative Code of City of New York because
statutory language covers all exercises of “managerial or supervisory responsibility”).
182
This rationale for strict liability where general deterrence is the primary goal of
policy derives from the work of Judge Calabresi. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970), esp. chs. 7 and 10; Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict
Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972).
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reasonably assumes that in most cases the costs of avoidance are greater
for an employee-victim of her supervisor’s harassment than for an employer with authority over that supervisor. The two-pronged
affirmative defense that qualifies an employer’s strict liability under
the Faragher-Ellerth doctrine, however, recognizes that this assumption
cannot be made when it can be shown both that the employer took
reasonable avoidance steps and that the employee did not.183 This
policy rationale also helps explain the Court’s acceptance of a more
forgiving negligence standard to govern employer liability to an employee who suffers discriminatory harassment from coworkers without
delegated authority to affect her work life;184 it is not as likely that an
employee-victim would incur greater costs than her employer in avoiding or preventing harassment by coworkers whom she can avoid or
report on without fear of reprisal.185
183
For a fuller development of this rationale, see Michael C. Harper, Employer Liability
for Harassment Under Title VII: A Functional Rationale for Faragher and Ellerth, 36 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 41 (1999). See also J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment Discrimination
Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 273, Part IV (1995) (explaining why employers should be subject to
conditional-notice liability for individual claims of discrimination).
184
Although the first prong of the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense articulates a reasonable-care standard for employers to prevent and correct harassment that seems similar
to that set by a negligence standard, see 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (2015) (stating employer is
negligent if it knew or should have known of harassment and failed to take corrective
action), a negligence standard for employer liability is more forgiving for several reasons.
First, the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense includes a second prong that conditions the
avoidance of employer liability for a supervisor’s harassment on the employee not taking
reasonable-avoidance steps, as well as on the employer meeting a reasonable care standard.
Therefore, in cases where the employer did not and could not know of the harassment, it
could still be liable if the employee herself was not negligent. Second, the Faragher-Ellerth
doctrine provides an affirmative defense that reverses the burden of proof on to employers. And, third, a negligence approach presumably requires proof of causation, while causation does not seem to be an element of the affirmative defense. Indeed, Justice
Thomas’s dissent in Faragher, which assumed that a negligence standard should be applied
for the harassment in that case, was based in part on the majority’s failure to consider
whether any deficiencies in Boca Raton’s antiharassment policy and practice led to its lack
of knowledge of Faragher being harassed. See 524 U.S. 775, 810–11 (1998) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
185
But see Harper, supra note 183, at 82–86 (arguing that the justifications for employer liability for supervisory harassment extend to coworker harassment).
The rationale, however, does not support the Court’s closely divided (5-4) decision in
Vance v. Ball State University, 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013). That decision limits an employer’s
qualified strict vicarious liability to harassment by supervisors whom “the employer has
empowered . . . to take tangible employment actions against the victim, i.e., to effect a
‘significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant
change in benefits.’” Id. at 2443 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,
761 (1998)). The Vance Court rejected the broader reach of the Faragher-Ellerth doctrine
advocated by the EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance, which ties “supervisor status to the ability to exercise significant direction over another’s daily work.” Id. (citing EEOC, Enforcement Guidance, supra note 130). Whether or not the Vance majority was correct in
claiming that its limitation provided a much clearer line for judges and juries to apply than
did the EEOC standard, see id. at 2450–51, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s dissent in support
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The same policy rationale indicates why the Faragher-Ellerth doctrine could influence the development of state common law just as it
has influenced the construction of state antidiscrimination law. In
some cases, a supervisor’s harassment of subordinate employees may
constitute an actionable common-law tort186 that would expose the
harassing supervisor to liability.187 Employer liability in such cases,
however, poses the same doctrinal challenge as that confronted by the
Court in Faragher and Ellerth. Many state courts, especially before the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 first authorized the grant of compensatory
damages under Title VII,188 held employers liable for tortious sexual
harassment under a theory of direct liability for negligent supervision,
akin to the negligence standard for employer liability for coworker
harassment actionable under Title VII.189 This theory provides a basis
of the EEOC approach expressed a better understanding of why supervisors should be
distinguished from coworkers for purposes of rules defining employer liability:
Exposed to a fellow employee’s harassment, one can walk away or tell the
offender to “buzz off.” A supervisor’s slings and arrows, however, are not so
easily avoided. An employee who confronts her harassing supervisor risks,
for example, receiving an undesirable or unsafe work assignment or an unwanted transfer. She may be saddled with an excessive workload or with
placement on a shift spanning hours disruptive of her family life. . . .
...
. . . A supervisor with authority to control subordinates’ daily work is no less
aided in his harassment than is a supervisor with authority to fire, demote,
or transfer.
Id. at 2456, 2458 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
186
See, e.g., Patterson v. Augat Wiring Sys., Inc., 944 F. Supp. 1509, 1523–27 (M.D. Ala.
1996) (recognizing harassment may constitute torts of assault, battery, outrage, or possibly
invasion of privacy under Alabama law); Davis v. Utah Power & Light Co., No. 87-C-0659G,
1988 WL 217350, at *4 (D. Utah Nov. 23, 1988) (recognizing harassment may constitute
torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, and battery under Utah law);
GTE Sw., Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 615–16 (Tex. 1999) (recognizing harassment may
constitute tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress under Texas law).
187
The lower courts have interpreted the word “agent” in the definition of employer
in Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012), to incorporate agency-liability principles, but
not to render agents subject to direct liability. See, e.g., Wathen v. Gen. Elec. Co., 115 F.3d
400, 405–06 (6th Cir. 1997) (concluding that “Congress did not intend individuals to face
liability under the definition of ‘employer’ it selected for Title VII”); Williams v. Banning,
72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a supervisor, in an individual capacity, did
not “fall within Title VII’s definition of employer”).
188
See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2012). Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Title VII only
authorized equitable relief, including back pay and reinstatement. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(g)(1) (2012). Such equitable relief would not be meaningful to a victim of sexual harassment who suffered abusive working conditions, but not an adverse “tangible” employment
decision, such as a discharge, demotion, or pay cut, at least unless the working conditions
were sufficiently severe to constitute constructive discharge. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 76–78 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring). Providing a meaningful remedy
for discriminatory abusive working conditions was indeed one of the primary impetuses for
the 1991 Act. See Michael C. Harper, Eliminating the Need for Caps on Title VII Damage
Awards: The Shield of Kolstad v. American Dental Association, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 477, 481–83 (2011).
189
See, e.g., Baker v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342, 1347–48 (10th Cir. 1990) (applying Oklahoma law; jury found employer knew of sexual harassment, but did not act to
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for direct employer liability for harassment that is not within the scope
of employment and thus subject to vicarious liability, and which also
may not be subject to the exclusive remedy provided in workers’ compensation laws for injuries arising out of as well as within the course of
employment.190 The theory, however, requires proof of an employer’s
managerial negligence, even in cases like Faragher and Ellerth where
the harassment is inflicted on subordinate employees. In order to expand employer liability from a direct-negligence to a vicarious-strict
standard,191 courts had to expand the concept of “scope of employment”192 or of “aided by the agency relationship”193 beyond that
adopted by either the Restatement Second or Third of Agency or by
the Court in Faragher or Ellerth.194
stop it); Patterson, 944 F. Supp. at 1528–29 (applying Alabama law); Kerans v. Porter Paint
Co., 575 N.E.2d 428, 433 (Ohio 1991) (employer “may be independently liable for failing
to take corrective action against an employee who poses a threat of harm to fellow employees”); Cox v. Brazo, 303 S.E.2d 71, 73 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (same).
190
Every jurisdiction in the United States has a workers’ compensation system that
provides compensation without regard to fault for at least physical injuries arising out of
and in the course of employment. In all jurisdictions this compensation provides a remedy
that precludes other recovery for the same injuries. See LARSON, supra note 124, § 100.01.
The tort of negligent supervision, however, may subject even employers otherwise covered
by workers’ compensation to direct liability for the mental or emotional distress caused by
harassment outside the scope of employment. See, e.g., Sisco v. Fabrication Techs., Inc.,
350 F. Supp. 2d 932, 943 (D. Wyo. 2004); Patterson, 944 F. Supp. at 1528–29; Gerber v.
Vincent’s Men’s Hairstyling, Inc., 57 So. 3d 935, 938 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Gasper v.
Ruffin Hotel Corp. of Md., Inc., 960 A.2d 1228, 1239–40 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008); Hogan
v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 340 S.E.2d 116, 124 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986); Kerans, 575 N.E.2d
at 435. But see Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Corp., 690 A.2d 936, 937 (Del. 1996); Fields v.
Cummins Emps. Fed. Credit Union, 540 N.E.2d 631, 636–37 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); Peterson v. Arlington Hospitality Staffing, Inc., 689 N.W.2d 61, 64–65 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (all
finding preclusion of claims for negligent supervision of harassment).
191
For an explanation of why this is an expansion of employer liability, see supra note
159.
192
See, e.g., State v. Schallock, 941 P.2d 1275, 1285–86 (Ariz. 1997) (holding sexual
assaults by supervisor at work place, even though not to serve the employer, were “foreseeable” because of employer’s knowledge and thus within scope of employment); see also
supra text accompanying notes 149–57.
193
See, e.g., Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1559–60 (11th Cir.
1987) (Title VII liability); Rauh v. Coyne, 744 F. Supp. 1186, 1191 (D.D.C. 1990) (employer
could be liable for sexual assault by a supervisory manager because assault was aided by the
agency relationship). For discussion of why this treatment of “aided by the agency relationship” is expansive, see supra text accompanying notes 157–65.
194
Some courts also found employers directly liable for harassment-based torts
through expansion of the agency-law concept of ex post authorization or “ratification.”
See, e.g., Simon v. Morehouse Sch. of Med., 908 F. Supp. 959, 973 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (negligent supervision constitutes ratification under Georgia law); Mardis v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 669 So. 2d 885, 889–90 (Ala. 1995) (holding ratification doctrine obviates need to
prove employer’s negligence-caused injury); Jones v. B.L. Dev. Corp., 940 So. 2d 961, 966
(Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (doing nothing to reprimand a known employee-wrongdoer is ratification). These decisions equated an employer’s failure to control known harassment with
ratification of that harassment, ignoring the traditional common-law requirement that the
agent must have “acted or purported to act as an agent” of the ratifying principal. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.03 (2006) (“A person may ratify an act if the actor
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The Faragher-Ellerth doctrine now offers state courts a compromise
of qualified vicarious liability with as strong a rationale for tort liability
as for liability under statutory antidiscrimination law.195 The issue of
employer liability for its supervisors’ actionable torts on employers remains important even after the Civil Rights Act of 1991’s authorization of compensatory damages, not only because those damages are
limited by caps,196 but also because some of those actionable torts may
not be discriminatory and thus actionable under an antidiscrimination statute.197 For instance, a supervisor’s harassment or bullying of
subordinate employees may be sufficiently “extreme and outrageous”
to constitute the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
under a state’s substantive tort law,198 regardless of whether the bullying is in any manner discriminatory.199 If the bullying is not remedial
through an exclusive workers’ compensation remedy, either because
it was not within the scope of employment200 or because the resultant
acted or purported to act as an agent on the person’s behalf.”); see also, e.g., Fretland v.
Cnty. of Humboldt, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 379, 384 (Ct. App. 1998) (“Ratification is the voluntary
election by a person to adopt in some manner as his own an act which was purportedly
done on his behalf by another person, the effect of which, as to some or all persons, is to
treat the act as if originally authorized by him.”). Harassers, of course, do not typically
purport to be acting on behalf of their employers, even when they use their delegated
power to control their victims.
195
The Restatement of Employment Law states this compromise as an option for state
law. Section 4.03(c) provides that employer liability may derive from
the tortious abuse or threatened abuse of a supervisory or managerial employee’s authority, if the applicable law provides, even if the abuse or
threatened abuse is not within the scope of employment, unless the employer can demonstrate that: (1) the employer took reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct the actual or threatened abuse of authority; and
(2) the employee unreasonably failed either to: (A) take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunity the employer provided, or (B) otherwise avoid the harm.
RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T Law § 4.03(c) (2015).
196
See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2012) (limiting compensatory and punitive damages
to a sum ranging from $50,000 to $300,000, depending on the size of the employer).
197
Harassment, of course, is only actionable under Title VII if it is discriminatory. See
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80–81 (1998).
198
See, e.g., GTE Sw., Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 616–17 (Tex. 1999) (holding that
supervisor intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress by regularly cursing and threatening subordinates with violence).
199
Courts, on the other hand, have found sexual harassment to be severe or pervasive
enough to be actionable under Title VII, but not sufficiently extreme and outrageous to
constitute the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Miner v. MidAmerica Door Co., 68 P.3d 212, 220, 223–24 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002); Hoy v. Angelone, 720
A.2d 745, 754 (Pa. 1998).
200
See, e.g., Horodyskyj v. Karanian, 32 P.3d 470, 474 (Colo. 2001) (“[I]n the usual
case, injuries resulting from workplace sexual harassment do not arise out of an employee’s employment for purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Act [of Colorado].”);
Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099, 1104 n.7 (Fla. 1989) (noting
that sexual harassment is not covered by Florida’s workers’ compensation act because it
does not “arise out of employment”).
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severe distress did not derive primarily from a physical injury,201 the
issue of employer liability must be resolved. The argument for resolution of that issue through the affirmative defense-qualified vicarious
liability delineated in Faragher and Ellerth is as strong as it was for Title
VII liability for the discriminatory harassment in those cases. Furthermore, the state’s substantive tort law presumably has as strong a deterrent policy as the Title VII policy on which Justices Souter and
Kennedy purported to rest their new doctrine of qualified vicarious
liability.202
The potential influence on state common law of the Court’s new
qualified vicarious liability doctrine, moreover, may extend well beyond cases brought by subordinate employees. The doctrine also is
well suited to define employer liability for torts inflicted by employees
outside the scope of employment, in part because of the employer’s
significant augmentation of the employees’ opportunities to commit
these torts. Just as employers augment the opportunities of employees
to engage in harassment by investing the employees with supervisory
authority over subordinate employees, so do employers augment opportunities for intentional torts by the establishment of other
subordinate and dependent relationships. These relationships include those of guards and police with prisoners or other citizens subject to their authority and weapons, mental health and other medical
employees with their patients, teacher-employees with their students,
and clerical employees with their parishioners.
Not surprisingly, when employees in positions of power because
of such relationships have abused that power to commit intentional
torts, such as sexual or other assaults, some state courts have fashioned agency doctrine to impose strict vicarious liability on employers.203 They have done so either by expanding the concept of a scope
of employment to include at least “foreseeable” abuses of an employment position204 or by a broad interpretation of the “aided by the
201
See, e.g., Sisco v. Fabrication Techs., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 932, 942–43 (D. Wyo.
2004) (noting that Wyoming workers’ compensation law covers only mental injuries caused
by compensable physical injuries); Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., 575 N.E.2d 428, 431 (Ohio
1991) (noting that “psychological disturbances arising solely from emotional stress” are not
within Ohio workers’ compensation act’s definition of injury).
202
See supra text accompanying notes 182–85.
203
Justice Souter in his Faragher opinion, 524 U.S. 775, 795–96 (1998), cited several of
these cases. See, e.g., Primeaux v. United States, 102 F.3d 1458, 1462–63 (8th Cir. 1996)
(police officer’s sexual assault of stranded motorist); Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr.,
791 P.2d 344, 348–49 (Alaska 1990) (therapist’s sexual abuse of patient); Mary M. v. Los
Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1349–52 (Cal. 1991) (police officer’s rape of motorist under
arrest).
204
See, e.g., Red Elk v. United States, 62 F.3d 1102, 1107 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying
South Dakota law, and holding that “it was also foreseeable that a male officer with authority to pick up a teenage girl out alone at night in violation of the curfew might be tempted
to violate his trust”); Samuels v. S. Baptist Hosp., 594 So. 2d 571, 573 (La. Ct. App. 1992)
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agency relationship” language in section 219(2)(d) of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency.205 In Doe v. Forrest, the Supreme
Court of Vermont indeed relied on the Court’s interpretation of section 219(2)(d) in Farragher and Ellerth to deny summary judgment in
favor of a sheriff’s department for a deputy sheriff’s sexual assault of a
citizen the deputy had used his authority to isolate.206 Although the
Forrest court did not adopt the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense compromise, it did openly embrace the Court’s role in influencing the
development of common-law doctrine:
It is, of course, the nature of the common law that every appellate
decision represents the development of the common law, and nothing in the Supreme Court decisions suggests they are not an integral
part of that process. Indeed, the resolution of the dispute over the
meaning of § 219(2)(d) in Faragher is exactly the kind of decision
that best defines and develops the common law. No common-law
court engaged in this process, and certainly not the highest court of
this country, would expect that a common-law decision on one set
of facts would have no influence on future decisions applying the
same legal principle to a different factual scenario.207

Most courts, however, have resisted the expansion of employer
vicarious liability for abuses of power by rogue employees other than
police officers and prison guards.208 The Faragher-Ellerth doctrine offers a workable compromise for a common-law reformulation that recognizes that employers are usually, but not always, in a better position
(hospital vicariously liable for nursing assistant’s rape of patient because rape was “reasonably incidental to the performance of his duties”); Plummer v. Ctr. Psychiatrists, Ltd., 476
S.E.2d 172, 174–75 (Va. 1996) (psychologist acted within scope of employment when his
therapy sessions included sexual intercourse with patient).
205
See, e.g., Doe v. Forrest, 853 A.2d 48, 57–69 (Vt. 2004) (sexual assault of deputy
sheriff on cashier working alone at a convenience store); see also West v. Waymire, 114 F.3d
646, 649 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that for “a male police officer whose employer has invested him with intimidating authority to deal in private with troubled teenaged girls, his
taking advantage of the opportunity . . . to extract sexual favors . . . should be sufficiently
within the orbit of his employer-conferred powers to bring the doctrine of respondeat
superior into play, even though he is not acting to further the employer’s goals but instead
is on a frolic of his own”) (Posner, J.; dicta) (citations omitted).
206
853 A.2d at 67–69.
207
Id. at 60 n.3.
208
See, e.g., Doe v. Newbury Bible Church, 933 A.2d 196, 198–200 (Vt. 2007) (distinguishing Forrest to decline to apply section 219(2)(d) to pastor’s sexual molestation of minor parishioner); Zsigo v. Hurley Med. Ctr., 716 N.W.2d 220, 227–29 (Mich. 2006)
(rejecting the Forrest court’s approach to section 219(d)(2), and holding that nursing assistant’s sexual abuse of restrained psychotic patient was not within scope of employment);
Graham v. McGrath, 363 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1033–34 (S.D. Ill. 2005) (applying Illinois law,
and holding that priest’s sexual abuse of young parishioner was not within scope of employment); John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 769 P.2d 948, 956 (Cal. 1989) (declining
to impose vicarious liability on school district for teacher’s sexual assault of student because a “teacher’s authority is different in both degree and kind” from “the authority of a
police officer over a motorist”).
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than are third-party victims to control the abuse of power vested in
such employees as teachers, clerics, medical professionals, and police
and security personnel. The same policies of deterrence and
avoidable consequences upon which Justices Souter and Kennedy relied in Faragher and Ellerth could be invoked by a state court in the
adoption of an affirmative defense-qualified vicarious employer liability for torts by their employees on third parties in subordinate or dependent relationships arising out of the employees’ employment
relationship.
III
ACTIONABLE EMPLOYER RETALIATION
Through the elaboration of the meaning of federal statutes, the
Supreme Court may influence the development of general state law,
including state common law, even without purporting to rely on or to
modify general common law. It may do so by providing a resolution
for a legal issue posed by a statute that is the same as or at least parallel to an issue posed by state law. An excellent example is provided by
the Court’s interpretation of the antiretaliation provision in Title
VII209 in Burlington Northern v. White.210 In this case the Court defined
which actions of an employer or its agents may be violations of Title
VII’s antiretaliation provision if taken against an employee because of
that employee’s involvement in activity protected by the provision.211
Although the Court’s definition was only offered as an interpretation
of the particular Title VII provision, the definition provided a possible
resolution of a parallel problem posed not only by antiretaliation provisions in other federal employment statutes, but also by express and
implied antiretaliation provisions in state statutes, and, most significantly for the general common law of employment, by the public policy tort cause of action now recognized in some form in most
American jurisdictions.212
The Burlington Northern Court interpreted a provision that makes
it unlawful “for an employer to discriminate against” an employee or
employment applicant “because he has opposed any practice” that is
otherwise unlawful under Title VII or “because he has made a charge,
209

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because
he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012).
210
548 U.S. 53 (2006).
211
Id. at 57.
212
See infra text accompanying notes 230–37.
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testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing” under Title VII.213 The Court stated that the
case required it to “characterize how harmful an act of retaliatory
discrimination must be in order to fall within [this] provision’s
scope.”214 It did so by adopting language suggested by two courts of
appeals: “a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have
found the challenged action materially adverse, ‘which in this context
means it well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making
or supporting a charge of discrimination.’’”215 The Court explained
that determining whether a reasonable worker would be dissuaded
would provide strong protection of Title VII’s rights to press and support charges of discrimination without imposing burdensome regulation of “those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place
at work” and that are not likely to deter an employee’s invocation of
his or her protection against discrimination. The Court also stressed
that while the reasonable-employee standard is necessarily objective, it
is sufficiently general to be flexibly applied in the context of variant
circumstances, providing the example of an employee who is responsible for the care of young children being subjected to a schedule
change.216
The Burlington Northern Court’s interpretive law making was fully
policy based; it did not purport to express a general common-law default rule, as did the Court in Reid,217 Darden,218 and Clackamas.219
Nor did the analysis purport to build on or modify the common law,
as did the Court in Faragher and Ellerth.220 Yet the persuasive force of
the analysis was as applicable to any protection against employer retal213

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 61.
215
Id. at 68. The Court quoted language from Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219
(D.C. Cir. 2006), which in turn quoted Washington v. Ill. Dept. of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662
(7th Cir. 2005).
216
The Court also pronounced that unlike Title VII’s prohibition of status discrimination, Title VII’s antiretaliation provision “extends beyond workplace-related or employment-related retaliatory acts and harm.” Id. at 67. This pronouncement was superfluous
dicta because the employer actions found to be retaliatory in the case, the reassignment of
the plaintiff from forklift duty to standard track laborer tasks and a thirty-seven-day suspension without pay, were both clearly workplace- and employment-related actions. The pronouncement makes a difference in a case like Rochon, where the employer was the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and its retaliation took the form of the refusal to follow policy in
investigating death threats a federal prisoner made against the plaintiff.
217
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989); see supra text accompanying note 38.
218
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992); see supra text accompanying note 59.
219
Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003); see supra
text accompanying note 95.
220
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); see supra text accompanying note 130.
214

R
R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-6\CRN603.txt

1326

unknown

Seq: 46

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

16-SEP-15

15:46

[Vol. 100:1281

iation as it was to the protection afforded by the Title VII provision at
issue in Burlington Northern. If the Court’s legal formulation struck the
correct policy balance for this provision, it also arguably struck the
correct balance for a general common-law default rule to be adopted
by federal courts for other federal antiretaliation guarantees and by
state courts for antiretaliation guarantees in state law that do not carry
specific statutory definitions of proscribed retaliatory acts.
There are indeed many such federal and state-law guarantees.
Most modern federal221 and state,222 and some older,223 statutes that
provide protections or minimum benefits to employees also include
provisions that protect employees from retaliation, at least for filing
charges or participating in official proceedings to enforce the protections or claim the benefits.224 Federal and state legislators seem to
have appreciated that the securing of an employee statutory right, like
the right to be free of particular forms of status discrimination secured by Title VII, requires the protection from retaliation of a victim’s invocation of the right. Furthermore, few antiretaliation
provisions in federal and state employment statutes carry sufficiently
limiting definitions of what retaliations might be actionable to obviate
the use of a common default rule like that provided by Burlington
Northern.225 Not surprisingly, therefore, Burlington Northern has pro221
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) (2012) (antiretaliation provision of Family Medical
Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA)); 42 U.S.C. § 12203 (2012) (antiretaliation provision of Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)); 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2012) (antiretaliation provision of Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)); 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)
(2012) (antiretaliation provision of Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970); 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(d) (2012) (antiretaliation provision of Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (ADEA)).
222
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1464 (2010); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(g)-(h)
(West 2014); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.055 (West. 2013).
223
See, for instance, the antiretaliation provision of the 1938-enacted Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 203 (2012). This provision, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2012),
also covers the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2012), which was passed in 1963 as an
amendment to the FLSA.
224
Unlike the antiretaliation provision of Title VII, some statutory antiretaliation provisions by their express terms protect only participation in official proceedings to protect
the underlying right. For instance, the FLSA provision, see supra note 223, states that it is
unlawful for any person:
To discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee
because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to
be instituted any proceedings under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding . . . .
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). In Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics, 131 S.Ct. 1325 (2011),
the Court held that oral complaints may be protected by this provision, but it left open
whether the provision protects a complaint to an employer rather than to the government.
See also the delineated antiretaliation provision in section 510 of the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2012).
225
None of the federal statutes cited in note 221 does so.
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vided such a rule not only for federal statutes,226 but also for many
state statutes with express antiretaliation provisions that do not define
prohibited retaliatory acts.227
Judges interpreting statutes offering benefits or protections to
employees without inclusion of an express antiretaliation guarantee
also have appreciated that such a guarantee is necessary to meet statutory purposes. Thus, both the Supreme Court228 and the highest
courts of numerous states229 have found antiretaliation guarantees to
be implicit in general statutory provisions. For instance, relying on
several decades of precedent,230 the Court in Gomez-Perez v. Potter 231
held that the prohibition in section 633a(a) of “discrimination based
on age” in personnel actions in the federal government232 “includes
retaliation based on the filing of an age discrimination complaint,”
even though the provision does not refer expressly in any way to retali226
See, e.g., Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 165–66 (2d Cir. 2011) (joining “sister circuits” in applying Burlington Northern test to antiretaliation provision in
FMLA); Mogenhan v. Napolitano, 613 F.3d 1162, 1166–67 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (applying test
to ADA retaliation claim); Nagle v. Vill. of Calumet Park, 554 F.3d 1106, 1121 (7th Cir.
2009) (applying test to ADEA retaliation claim); Ergo v. Int’l Merchs. Servs., Inc., 519 F.
Supp. 2d 765, 779–80 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (applying test to FLSA retaliation claim).
227
See, e.g., Gossard v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 612 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1252–53 (S.D.
Fla. 2009) (applying Burlington Northern to retaliation claim under Florida Civil Rights Act,
Fla. St. §760.10(7) (2010)); Swanson v. Minnesota, 2008 WL 4375985 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
2008) (applying Burlington Northern standard to antiretaliation provisions of Minnesota
Whistleblower and Occupational Safety and Health Acts, Minn. Stat. §§ 181.932, Subdiv.
1(a), 12654, Subdiv. 9 (2006)); Montgomery County v. Park, 246 S.W.3d 610, 614 (Tex.
2007) (“a personnel action is adverse within the meaning of the Whistleblower Act [Tex.
Gov’t Code § 554.002 (2012)] if it would be likely to dissuade a reasonable, similarly situated worker from making a report under the Act”); Secherest v. Lear Siegler Services, Inc.,
2007 WL 1186597 (M.D. Tenn. 2007) (applying Burlington Northern standard to Tennessee
Human Rights Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-311 (2011)); Niu v. Revcor Molded Products
Co., 206 S.W.3d 723, 731 (Tex. App. 2006) (applying Burlington Northern to antiretaliation
provision in Texas Labor Code § 21.055 (2015) covering employment discrimination). But
see Fincher v. Depository Trust and Clearing Corp., 604 F.3d 712, 723 (2d Cir. 2010)
(stressing that the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. code § 8-107(7)
(2015), makes it illegal to retaliate “in any manner”); Ivan v. County of Middlesex, 595
F.Supp.2d 425, 470–71 (D.N.J. 2009) (declining to apply Burlington Northern “because the
language of Title VII differs from LAD [New Jersey Law Against Discrimination] as interpreted by New Jersey courts”).
228
See infra text accompanying notes 230–31, 233.
229
See infra text accompanying notes 234–35.
230
The Court relied primarily on Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 306 U.S. 229
(1969) (finding that the prohibition of race discrimination in property transactions in 42
U.S.C. § 1982 (2012) makes cognizable a claim for retaliation for opposing race discrimination in housing) and Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (implying protection against retaliation for filing a complaint with the government from the
prohibition of gender discrimination in Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20
U.S.C. § 1681 (2012)). The Court in Jackson stated that “when a funding recipient retaliates against a person because he complains of sex discrimination, this constitutes intentional discrimination ‘on the basis of sex,’ in violation of Title IX.” Id. at 174.
231
553 U.S. 474 (2008).
232
29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (2012).
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ation.233 The lack of any explicit reference to retaliation in section
633a(a) obviously renders the implied retaliation prohibition in need
of some standard, like that provided by Burlington Northern, to define
which employer actions could constitute illegal retaliation.
Similarly, in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.,234 the Supreme Court of Illinois held that employees must have a cause of action for retaliation to
ensure implementation of the purposes of the Illinois Workmen’s
Compensation Act:
[T]he legislature enacted the workmen’s compensation law as a
comprehensive scheme to provide for efficient and expeditious
remedies for injured employees. This scheme would be seriously undermined if employers were permitted to abuse their power to terminate by threatening to discharge employees for seeking
compensation under the Act. . . . [W]hen faced with such a dilemma many employees, whose common law rights have been supplanted by the Act, would choose to retain their jobs, and thus, in
effect, would be left without a remedy either common law or statutory. This result . . . is untenable and is contrary to the public policy
as expressed in the Workmen’s Compensation Act.235
233
Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 479 (2008); see also CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981’s prohibition of race-based
employment discrimination in employment contracts supports a claim of retaliation for
opposing such discrimination). Whether the Court’s implication of a remedy for retaliation in Gomez-Perez, CBOCS West, and Jackson, see supra text accompanying note 230, in order
to ensure fulfillment of statutory purpose, was an appropriate use of judicial power is beyond the scope of this Essay. Justices Thomas and Scalia, who claim to reject
purpose-based statutory interpretations, dissented in all three cases. See 553 U.S. at
492–506 (Roberts, J., dissenting); 553 U.S. at 457–73 (Thomas, J., dissenting); 544 U.S. at
184–96 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
234
384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
235
Id. at 181–82. It is not clear but makes no real difference whether the Kelsay court,
in the manner of the Court in Gomez-Perez, found the retaliation cause of action to be
implied in the Illinois statute or rather purported to exercise its common-law-making
power in the creation of the retaliation cause of action. A state court, however, would have
to assert its full common-law-making power in order to create a right of action against
retaliation for asserting a right under a federal law. See, e.g., Flenker v. Williamette Industries, Inc., 967 P.2d 295 (Kan. 1998) (holding that the remedy for retaliation for asserting a
right under the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act does not preclude a state common-law cause of action for wrongful discharge for asserting the right). For a decision
more clearly relying on a workers’ compensation statute, rather than general common-lawmaking authority, to imply a cause of action for retaliatory termination, see Frampton v.
Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 427–28 (Ind. 1973) (noting that the relevant statute states that no “device shall . . . relieve any employer . . . of any obligation created by this
act”). For decisions in other jurisdictions creating or implying a cause of action for retaliatory termination for the exercise of rights under a worker’s compensation statute, see, e.g.,
Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1983) (employers’ actions that prevented employee from asserting statutory right to medical treatment and compensation
violated public policy underlying state statute); Hansen v. Harrah’s, 675 P.2d 394 (Nev.
1984) (public-policy exception existed for at-will employment, making retaliatory discharge for seeking workers’ compensation actionable in tort); Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793 (N.D. 1987) (retaliatory discharge for seeking workers’
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Like the Supreme Court’s implication of a prohibition of retaliation
in an antidiscrimination provision in cases like Gomez-Perez, a state
court’s creation of a cause of action for unlawful termination in cases
like Kelsay without the guidance of any specific statutory directives requires asking a policy question that was answered generally in Burlington Northern: If protections against termination are necessary to ensure
underlying statutory rights, which employer actions are sufficiently significant to warrant a cognizable claim?236
Indeed, the potential utility of the general law making in Burlington Northern for state law is even more significant because of other
modifications over the past several decades in the common-law employment-at-will default principle. That principle, of course, generally
construes employment for an indefinite term as terminable at the will
of either party for any reason.237 It has been qualified by antidiscrimination and other statutes and by the implication of causes of action like those described above to ensure the protection of employee
compensation violated public policy); Shick v. Shirey, 716 A.2d 1231 (Pa. 1998) (at-will employee alleging retaliatory discharge for filing a workers’ compensation claim stated a
cause of action under Pennsylvania law); Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d
793 (N.D. 1987); Clanton v. Claim-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984) (termination
despite at-will employment was improper because employers were not allowed to circumvent comprehensive legislative scheme meant to prove a remedy for injured employees);
Griess v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 776 P.2d 752 (Wyo. 1989) (tort action for retaliatory
discharge not precluded by state statute). State courts also have implied rights of action
against retaliation for asserting rights under other kinds of employee protection or benefit
statutes. See, e.g., Lara v. Thomas, 512 N.W.2d 777, 782 (Iowa 1994) (right of action against
discharge for filing partial unemployment compensation claim); Highhouse v. Avery
Transp., 660 A.2d 1374, 1378 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (right of action against discharge for
claiming unemployment compensation).
236
Although the Illinois Supreme Court declined to extend the retaliatory discharge
cause of action it recognized in Kelsay to a case of retaliatory demotion, see Zimmerman v.
Buchheit of Sparta, 645 N.E.2d 877 (Ill. 1994), courts in other jurisdictions have expanded
the protection of workers’ compensation claimants to cover other forms of retaliation. For
instance, in Trosper v. Bar ‘N Save, 734 N.W.2d 704 (Neb. 2007), the Supreme Court of
Nebraska held that a cause of action for retaliatory demotion exists against an employer
that demotes an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim. In his concurring
opinion, Judge Gerrard explained that “undue interference with the employment relationship” could be avoided by delimiting the cause of action based on the Burlington Northern
definition of materially adverse. Id. at 715; see also, e.g., Robel v. Roundup Corp., 59 P.3d
611, 629 (Wash. 2002) (Washington statute that states an employer may not “discriminate”
against an employer for filing a compensation claim may cover retaliatory verbal harassment); Brigham v. Dillon Cos., Inc., 935 P.2d 1054, 1059–60 (Kan. 1997) (“[C]ause of
action for retaliatory demotion is a necessary and logical extension of the cause of action
for retaliatory discharge.”). Brigham is discussed further infra at text accompanying note
244.
237
The employment-at-will default rule is recognized in all American jurisdictions, except Montana which has enacted a statute requiring a showing of “good cause” for all
terminations of an employee’s employment after the employee’s completion of a probationary period. See Montana Wrongful Discharge of Employment Act. MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 39-2-901-914 (1987). For a history of the origin of the rule, see Jay M. Feinman, The
Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976).
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rights.238 It also has been qualified in the current era by the creation
of other actions for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.
Some of this law making has been fashioned by state legislatures in
statutes protective of whistleblowers.239
The primary impetus for the wrongful-discharge-in-violation-ofpublic-policy cause of action, however, has come from the judiciary.
State courts have exercised their common-law-making authority to recognize such actions not only to secure employee rights, as in Kelsay,
but also to serve broader public purposes in cases where a discharged
employee is terminated for performing a public duty defined by
law,240 for refusing to commit an act that violates some law or perhaps
code of professional or occupational conduct,241 or for reporting or
inquiring about illegal employer conduct.242
State courts have created such actions for wrongful discharge to
serve public policy defined by other authoritative law or code making
bodies.243 They have done so recognizing that such public policy may
be undermined if employees are discouraged by the threat of discharge from acting in conformity with or to advance the rules set by
that policy. Such recognition, however, poses the question of whether
employees should be protected from retaliation through other forms
of discipline, short of termination. If employees can be discouraged
from serving a public interest by the threat of termination, could they
238

See supra text accompanying notes 221–27.
See, e.g., Cal. La. Code § 1102.5 (West 2013); Fla. Stat. § 448.102 (1991); Ill. Stat.
430/15-10 (2003); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 15.361-15.368 (1981); Minn. Stat. § 181.932
(1999); N.J. Stat. ANN. §§ 34:19-1-§ 9-8 (1986); N.Y. Lab. Law art. 20-C § 740 (McKinney
2006); 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 1421-28 (1986).
240
See, e.g., Texler v. Norfolk S. Ry., 957 F. Supp. 772 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (testifying truthfully at deposition; applying North Carolina law); Parada v. City of Colton, 29 Cal. Rptr. .2d
309 (Ct. App. 1994) (issuing stop orders against construction projects failing to satisfy permit requirements); Nees v. Hock, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975) (performance of jury duty).
241
See, e.g., Hobson v. McLean Hosp. Corp., 522 N.E.2d 975 (Mass. 1988) (refusing to
allow supervised nurses to violate state law in checking patients); Phipps v. Clark Oil &
Refining Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987) (refusing to pump leaded gas into car built
for unleaded gas in violation of federal law); Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 443 A.2d 728
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (refusing to close pharmacy in violation of state law).
242
See, e.g., Kanagy v. Fiesta Salons, Inc., 541 S.E.2d 616 (W.Va. 2000) (reporting unlicensed practice of cosmetology to regulating board); Green v. Ralee Eng’g Co., 960 P.2d
1046 (Cal. 1998) (reporting to management about aircraft parts that the employee reasonably believed was illegal); Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981) (supplying information about employee theft to law enforcement officers).
243
Some courts have recognized established principles of professional or occupational
conduct that have received judicial or other public sanction as a source of public policy for
the wrongful-discharge-in-violation-of-public-policy tort. See, e.g., LoPresti v. Rutland Regional Health Services, Inc., 865 A.2d 1102 (Vt. 2004) (medical ethical code may be source
of public policy); Rocky Mountain Hosp. & Med. Serv. v Mariani, 916 P.2d 519 (Colo.
1996) (public policy set by Colorado State Board of Accountancy Rules of Professional
Conduct); Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Grp., Inc., 652 A.2d 578 (Del. Ch. 1994) (attorney’s duty
to report wrongdoing of employer under code of ethics is a basis for public policy).
239
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not also be discouraged by a demotion or suspension or pay cut? If a
state recognizes some public policy as sufficiently strong to compromise an employer’s right to define the bounds of the employment
relationship, why not recognize it as sufficiently strong to qualify an
employer’s discretion over discipline short of termination?
A few state courts have indeed understood that recognition of a
tort of wrongful discipline is a logical corollary to the tort of wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy. As explained by the Supreme
Court of Kansas in Brigham v. Dillon Companies:
To conclude otherwise would be to repudiate this court’s recognition of a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. The obvious message would be for employers to demote rather than discharge
employees in retaliation for filing a workers compensation claim or
whistleblowing. Thus, employers could negate this court’s decisions
recognizing wrongful or retaliatory discharge by taking action falling short of actual discharge.244

This recognition, however, like the recognition of any action for retaliation, begs the question of scope for which the Burlington Northern
holding supplies a sensible default answer.
This question of scope for a wrongful-discipline cause of action
was considered in the drafting of the Restatement of Employment
Law. Citing decisions like Brigham and noting that there are “few reported cases [that] involve employees who have not been discharged,
or quit and alleged constructive discharge,” the Restatement of Employment Law, in a draft tentatively approved by the ALI membership
in May 2009, stated a tort of “Employer Discipline in Violation of Public Policy.” Drawing from Burlington Northern, section 4.01 of that draft
covered “an action short of discharge that is reasonably likely to deter
a similarly situated employee from engaging in protected activity, including an action that significantly affects employee compensation or
working conditions.”245
244
935 P.2d 1054, 1060 (Kan. 1997); see also, e.g., Powers v. Springfield City Schs., 1998
WL 336782 (Ohio Ct. App. June 26, 1998) (claim of wrongful failure to promote for performing duty to report child abuse); Garcia v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 232 Cal Rptr. 490 (Ct.
App. 1986) (claim of wrongful suspension and demotion for revealing mischarging to National Aeronautics and Space Administration); Trosper v. Bag ‘N Save, 734 N.W.2d 704
(Neb. 2007) (claim for retaliatory demotion exists against an employer that demotes an
employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim).
245
RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 4.01(b) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009). Section 4.01 of
this draft stated in full:
§ 4.01 Employer Discipline in Violation of Public Policy
(a) An employer that discharges or takes other material adverse action
against an employee because the employee has or will engage in protected activity under § 4.02 is subject to liability in tort for wrongful
discipline in violation of public policy, unless the statue or other law
that forms the basis of the applicable public policy precludes tort liabil-
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To be sure, a majority of those courts that have considered expanding the common-law claim of wrongful discharge to include
other adverse personnel actions, have declined to do so, in part
because of concern about additional regulation of employers’ personnel discretion.246 Indeed, in its final adopted form, the Restatement
of Employment Law, in deference to this judicial reluctance to expand the tort of wrongful discharge, does not cover wrongful discipline short of that which is sufficiently intolerable to warrant a
reasonable employee’s resignation, i.e., a constructive discharge.247
The Burlington Northern test nonetheless remains a useful standard for
any jurisdiction that adopts a comprehensive cause of action for
wrongful discipline, either through judicial or legislative law making.
IV
VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY

FOR

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Not all federal law making effected through the interpretation of
federal statutes can be expected to influence the general common law
of the states, however. There may be good reasons why newly formulated legal doctrine announced as an interpretation of a federal statute will not influence the resolution of parallel issues in state law even
when the new formulation purports to build on or refine the general
common law. First, the resolution of the parallel issues under state
ity or otherwise makes inappropriate judicial recognition of a tort
claim.
(b) “Other material adverse action” in this Section means an action
short of discharge that is reasonably likely to deter a similarly situated
employee from engaging in protected activity, including an action that
significantly affects employee compensation or working conditions.
246
See, e.g., Jewett v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 1997 WL 255093 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997)
(not recognizing claim for retaliatory demotion); Mintz v. Bell Atl. Sys. Leasing Int’l, Inc.,
905 P.2d 559, 562 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (“[T]ort of wrongful failure-to-promote does not
presently exist . . . .”); Hindo v. Univ. of Health Scis., 604 N.E.2d 463, 468 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992) (not recognizing claim for retaliatory demotion).
247
The Restatement’s final draft, as approved by the ALI Membership in May 2014,
deleted “other material adverse action” from the relevant black-letter language, to “reflect[ ] the majority view of the jurisdictions addressing the issue.” See RESTATEMENT OF
EMP’T LAW § 5.01(b) cmt. c (Council Draft No. 11, 2013) (in its final form Chapter 4 has
become Chapter 5). Comment c also explained that wrongful discharge “covers claims for
wrongful discharge,” and that “[a]n employer constructively discharges an employee if the
employer creates working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee under the
circumstances would be compelled to quit, and the employee in fact quits.” Id.
This standard for constructive discharge was endorsed by the Court in Pennsylvania
State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004). See supra text accompanying note 161. Courts
have recognized that the tort of wrongful discharge would be without substantial practical
meaning if it did not cover employer actions that made continuation of work intolerable
for reasonable employees. See, e.g., Strozinsky v. Sch. Dist. of Brown Deer, 614 N.W.2d 443
(Wis. 2000) (describing the narrow public-policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine as one where the plaintiff must establish that conditions were so intolerable that a
reasonable person confronted with the same circumstances would have been compelled to
resign).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-6\CRN603.txt

2015]

unknown

Seq: 53

FASHIONING A GENERAL COMMON LAW

16-SEP-15

15:46

1333

common law may be well established in each jurisdiction, even if not
set in the same manner in all. Second, the new formulation may be
dependent on a policy balance made in interpretation of the federal
law that is not persuasive to state courts making different policy balances under their own law.248
An example of federal judicial employment law making which
should not be influential for these reasons is provided by the Court’s
modification in Kolstad v. American Dental Association249 of the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Agency250 and of the Restatement (Second) of Torts251 (Restatement Rule) to the imposition of
punitive damages on employers for the torts of their agents. After first
holding that the Title VII standard of culpability for the imposition of
punitive damages is subjective knowledge of a risk of acting in violation of law,252 the Court in Kolstad also held that employers should not
be liable for punitive damages for their agents’ knowing violation of
Title VII, even in cases where the Restatement Rule’s standard of employer complicity through managerial agents is met, if “the discriminatory employment decision of [the] managerial agents” were
“contrary to the employer’s ‘good-faith efforts to comply with Title
VII.’”253
The Kolstad Court’s reasons for modifying the Restatement Rule
for purposes of Title VII, though potentially applicable to a general
common-law rule, were not sufficiently persuasive to have a likely salu248
Neither of these reasons seem applicable to the potential federal contributions to
the general common law of employment thus far considered in this Essay. For instance,
the definition of employee has never been fully crystallized because of the flexibility of the
multifactor tests, see supra text accompanying notes 51–61, and the exclusion of controlling
owners from this definition only has become salient recently, see supra text accompanying
notes 103–06. Further, as argued above, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Clackamas, see
supra text accompanying notes 107–10, Faragher-Ellerth, see supra text accompanying notes
174–80, and Burlington Northern, see supra text accompanying notes 209–16, carry persuasive
rationales that could influence the development of unsettled general common law.
249
527 U.S. 526, 545–46 (1999).
250
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C (1958) (“Punitive damages can properly
be awarded against a master or other principal because of an act by an agent if, but only if:
(a) the principal authorized the doing and [the] manner of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the
scope of employment, or
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or approved the act.”).
251
Section 909 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states the same formulation as
that in section 217C of the Restatement (Second) of Agency. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 909 (1965) (listing the same four instances by which punitive damages may be
awarded). The Restatement (Third) of Agency, section 7.03 cmt. e, at 156–60, endorses
the approach of section 909, interpreting it to provide that “unless a tortfeasor is a managerial agent, punitive damages may be awarded against an organizational principal only when
the culpability of a managerial agent can be shown.” Id. at 158.
252
See 527 U.S. at 535–36.
253
See id. at 545–46.

R
R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-6\CRN603.txt

1334

unknown

Seq: 54

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

16-SEP-15

15:46

[Vol. 100:1281

tary effect on the common law of most states. The Restatement Rule
allows punitive damages when the tort-committing agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of employment, or when a managerial agent ratified or approved the tortious
act.254 In her opinion for the Kolstad Court, Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor expresses dissatisfaction with basing employer liability for
punitive damages on the culpability of some manager when the employer “himself is personally innocent and therefore liable only vicariously”255 because he has “undertaken good faith efforts at
compliance.”256 Justice O’Connor’s personalization of employers is a
distortion of the reality of the modern economy, however. Most employers are legal entities that act only through their human agents. It
is not obvious why an employer that employs culpable managerial decision-making agents257 should be described as innocent.
Justice O’Connor also asserted that adopting the Restatement
Rule on employer liability for punitive damages “would reduce the
incentive for employers to implement antidiscrimination programs.”258 This assertion seems illogical. The greater an employer’s
vulnerability to punitive damages, the greater the incentive to implement antidiscrimination programs to ensure the avoidance of discrimination that could result in onerous damage awards. Also
unconvincing is Justice O’Connor’s suggestion that adoption of the
Restatement Rule, in tandem with the underlying Title VII knowingviolation standard for punitive damages,259 would penalize “those who
educate themselves and their employees on Title VII’s prohibitions.”260 Few officers and decision makers today do not understand
the basic antidiscrimination prohibitions of Title VII; effective
antidiscrimination programs require much more than education.
Of course providing a maximum incentive to avoid tortious acts is
not the only consideration in setting rules for punitive damages, as it
is not the only consideration in setting any liability rules. More easily
254

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1965).
527 U.S at 544 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 cmt. b (1965))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
256
Id. at 544.
257
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03 cmt. e (2006) (“[T]o determine
whether an agent is a ‘managerial agent’ . . . the determination should focus on the agent’s
discretion to make decisions that would have prevented the injury to the plaintiff or that
determine policies of the organization relevant to the risk that resulted in the injury.”).
258
Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 544.
259
This first part of the Kolstad decision confirmed that the “malice” or “reckless indifference” standard for the grant of punitive damages for Title VII violations, “does not
require a showing of egregious or outrageous discrimination independent of the employer’s state of mind,” but “pertain[s] to the employer’s knowledge that it may be acting
in violation of federal law, not its awareness that it is engaging in discrimination.” Id. at
535 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (2012)).
260
Id. at 544.
255
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available punitive damages can result in inefficient levels of avoidance,
regulation, and litigation, depending on the likelihood of recovery
and the level of damages. Ultimately, setting rules for punitive damages requires a difficult policy balance that also takes into account the
degree to which the substantive law being enforced may carry a moral
condemnation of its intentional, reckless, or even negligent violators.
One reason Justice O’Connor’s “bad faith” overlay on the
Restatement Rule likely will not be influential is that she failed to engage directly with this difficult balancing.
A more important reason that the Kolstad Court’s modification of
the Restatement Rule will not have substantial influence on the general common law is that the states already have set their own policy
balance in variant but well-established ways, both by statute and by
judicial decision.261 Unlike the other common-law rules discussed in
this Article, the rules governing employer punitive liability do not
seem open to development or modification toward some general common-law consensus. First, states set different standards for the level of
fault required for the award of punitive damages,262 with a few jurisdictions not allowing any awards of punitive damages at all in common-law actions.263 Of those jurisdictions that do allow such
damages, many have set law for employer liability that varies widely
from the Restatement Rule. Some jurisdictions allow the award of punitive damages against employers for torts committed by employees
acting within the scope of their employment with the requisite mens
261

See infra notes 266–68.
Some jurisdictions require a conscious desire to injure, while some allow the imposition of punitive damages based on recklessness or even gross negligence. Compare Roby v.
McKesson Corp., 219 P.3d 749, 765 (Cal. 2009) (punitive damages are available under
California Civ. Code section 3294, subdiv. (a), “where it is proven by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.”); Darcars
Motors of Silver Spring, Inc. v. Borzym, 841 A.2d 828, 837 (Md. 2004) (punitive damages
require “actual malice” which is “characterized by evil motive, intent to injure, ill will, or
fraud.”), with Slovinski v. Elliot, 927 N.E.2d 1221, 1225 (Ill. 2010) (punitive damages available “when the defendant acts willfully, or with such gross negligence as to indicate a wanton disregard of the rights of others.”) and Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 883 A.2d 439, 446
(Pa. 2005) (punitive damages are available for “intentional, willful, wanton or reckless conduct . . . . (quoting SHV Coal, Inc. v Continental Grain Co., 587 A.2d 702, 704 (1991)
(internal quotations omitted)). Massachusetts has not accepted the Kolstad culpability
standard, see supra text accompanying note 252, even for its own parallel general antidiscrimination law. See, e.g., Haddad v. Wal-Mart, 914 N.E.2d 59, 74 (Mass. 2009) (punitive
damages may be awarded when the defendant’s conduct is “outrageous or egregious”).
263
See, e.g., Haddad, 914 N.E.2d at 75 (“We impose punitive damages only when authorized by statute.” (citing International Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 443 N.E.2d 1308
(Mass. 1983))); Laramie v. Stone, 999 A.2d 262 (N.H. 2010) (“New Hampshire does not
have punitive damages.”); Corona de Camargo v. Schon, 776 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Neb. 2009)
(punitive damages not recoverable for any torts); Barr v. Interbay Citizens Bank, 635 P.2d
441, 443 (Wash. 1981) (“Under the law of this state, punitive damages are not allowed
unless expressly authorized by the legislature.”).

R
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rea.264 A number of other jurisdictions, in contrast, by statute or
judicial decision are more restrictive of employer liability than is the
Restatement Rule.265
To be sure, numerous jurisdictions have adopted the Restatement Rule by statute or judicial decision.266 But few of those jurisdictions, or others, have been influenced by the Kolstad modification of
the Restatement approach. State-court citations of this modification
seem to have been limited to dicta in a few decisions interpreting state
statutes.267 Not surprisingly, because of the variance of state law268
264
See, e.g., Wiper v. Downtown Dev. Corp., 732 P.2d 200, 201 (Ariz. 1987); Infinity
Prods., Inc. v. Quandt, 775 N.E.2d 1144, 1154 (Ind. App. 2002); Embrey v. Holly, 442 A.2d
966, 970 (Md. 1982); Flood ex. rel. Oakley v. Holzwarth, 182 S.W.3d 673, 678–79 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2005); Dewitsky v. Pittson Lumber and Mfg. Co., 82 Pa. D. & C. 4th 18, 22
(Pa.Com.Pl. 2007); Bierman v. Aramark Refreshment Servs., Inc., 198 P.3d 877, 884 (Okla.
2008); Johannesen v. Salem Hosp., 82 P.3d 139, 142 (Or. 2003).
265
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1D-15(c) (2013) (North Carolina statute providing:
“Punitive damages shall not be awarded against a person solely on the basis of vicarious
liability for the acts or omissions of another. Punitive damages may be awarded against a
person only if that person participated in the conduct constituting the aggravating factor
giving rise to the punitive damages, or if, in the case of a corporation, the officers, directors, or managers of the corporation participated in or condoned the conduct constituting
the aggravating factor giving rise to punitive damages.”); Cavuoti v. New Jersey Transit
Corp., 735 A.2d 548, 551 (N.J. 1999) (in suit under state antidiscrimination statute, plaintiff must show “actual participation in or willful indifference to the wrongful conduct on
the part of upper management” and “proof that the offending conduct [is] especially egregious.” (quoting Rendine v. Pantzer, 661 A.2d 1202, 1202 (N.J. 1995))); Loughry v. Lincoln First Bank, N.A., 494 N.E.2d 70, 76, (N.Y. 1988) (“The agent’s level of responsibility
with the entity should be sufficiently high that his participation in the wrongdoing renders
the employer blameworthy, and arouses the ‘institutional conscience’ for corrective
action.”).
266
See, e.g., Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Thitchener, 192 P.3d 243, 257 (Nev.
2008) (applying Nev.Rev.Stat. 42.007 (2012)); Boykin v. Perkins Family Restaurant, No. C901-1100, 2002 WL 4548, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2002) (applying, in employee’s sexual
harassment case, Minn. Stat. § 549.20, subdiv. 2 (2000)); Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, 74
Cal. Rptr. 2d 510, 523 (App. 1 Dist. 1998) (applying Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(b) (1997));
Beriner v. Hyslop, 337 N.W.2d 858, 861 (Iowa 1983); Fitzgerald v. Edelen, 623 P.2d 418,
423 (Colo. App. 1980); Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus. Co., 330 N.E.2d 509, 512 (1975).
267
Shoucair v. Brown University, 917 A.2d 418, 433–36 (R.I. 2007) (discussing Kolstad
in a case decided under Rhode Island’s Fair Employment Practices Act, but deciding not to
impose punitive damages on employer because of Rhode Island’s own restrictive
common-law rule on employer liability); White v. Ultramar, Inc., 981 P.2d 944, 948 n.2
(Cal. 1999) (dicta indicating that Kolstad may have relevance in future cases under California’s statute on corporate liability for punitive damages, Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(b).). But cf.,
e.g., Jordan v. Bates Advertising Holdings, Inc., 816 N.Y.S.2d 310, 322 (Sup. Ct. 2006) (contrasting Kolstad’s interpretation of federal law, “the New York City Human Rights Law has
made good faith compliance procedures only a factor to be considered in mitigation of
punitive damages, rather than a complete defense”).
268
State statutes that cap punitive damages in some actions also set a particular policy
balance between the deterrent purposes of punitive damages and their economic costs.
See, e.g., Mo. Ann. Stat. § 52—538.210 (West (2014)) (limiting recovery for noneconomic
damages in medical malpractice actions to $350,000); Ga. Code Ann. § 51-12-5.1 (West
2010) (limiting punitive damages outside of products liability to $250,000 unless claimant
demonstrates an intent to harm); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 85K (West 2013) (limiting
tort liability of certain charitable organizations to $20,000 per action); Va. Code Ann.
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and the Kolstad decision not providing an adequate unifying principle,
the Restatement of Employment Law does not attempt to restate general common law on the issue of employer liability for punitive
damages.
CONCLUSION—A FEDERAL-STATE LAW-MAKING ENTERPRISE
These illustrations demonstrate the potential for federal-court
participation in a dynamic general common-law-making process, one
in which federal-court law-making through the interpretation of statutes can affect state common law in the same manner as federal common-law-making in the age of Swift, through persuasion, rather than
in the manner of the new federal common law under Erie, through
command. While the illustrations all highlight the kind of doctrinal
innovations that are likely to persuade state courts only after being
pronounced by the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts also can
influence the general common-law-making process by contributing to
the Court’s new doctrinal formulations. The Burlington Northern
Court’s fashioning of its holding through the adoption of language
from lower court decisions provides an example.269
This interactive general common-law-making process also can result in the Court refashioning existing law in the light of state-law developments; the Court’s role in the search for the best law need not
always be one of leadership. The Court’s adoption, in Moragne v.
States Marine Lines, Inc.,270 of a cause of action for wrongful death
under federal maritime common law271 provides a clear example of
the Court changing federal law to align with new state law. The Court
in Moragne relied in part on the states’ unanimous adoption of wrongful death actions to overturn its earlier holding in The Harrisburg272
rejecting any action for wrongful death under federal maritime common law.273 The fact that the legal developments relied on in Moragne
§ 8.01–38 (West 2009) (limiting punitive damages to $350,000). Indeed, the caps on compensatory and punitive damages set by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see supra text accompanying note 188, strike a particular balance for punitive damages that Justice O’Connor’s
modification of the Restatement Rule would seem to upset. Alternatively, a strong argument can be made that the Kolstad decision’s limitation on punitive damages obviates the
continuing need for the caps on Title VII damages. See Harper, supra note 188, at 494–96.
269
See supra text accompanying note 215. Indeed, the NLRB’s role in the development of the “entrepreneurial” test for employment status, see supra text accompanying
notes 72–88, and the EEOC’s guideline excluding controlling owners from such status, see
supra text accompanying notes 95–97, both suggest a role for the federal executive branch
as well.
270
398 U.S. 375 (1970).
271
See id. at 409.
272
119 U.S. 199 (1886).
273
See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 388–92.
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were primarily statutory274 does not make it less relevant to the potential for state common-law influence on federal judicial law-making.
Justice John Marshall Harlan II’s finely crafted opinion for the
Moragne Court explained why statutory law, like common-law developments in “England,”275 also can express a policy consensus “to be
given its appropriate weight not only in matters of statutory construction but also in those of decisional law.”276
In Moragne, the Court exercised the specialized federal
common-law-making authority it retained after Erie to formulate general maritime law rather than the authority to construe statutes as in
the employment law examples treated in this Essay. The distinction
between law-making authority outside of a statutory structure, like that
for federal maritime or admiralty law, and law-making authority delegated through general statutory provisions, like those interpreted in
this Essay’s examples, however, is not important to the potential relevance of state law. A statutory provision, like that in section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)277 or the general provisions of the Sherman Act,278 can provide as much authority to make
law as any constitutional provision. And even more confined statutory
authority, like that exercised in this Essay’s examples, must be responsive to considerations of the statute’s purposes in light of developing
public policy.
Recognition of the appropriateness of the Court’s exercise of statutory-based lawmaking authority in response to state law developments does not entail adoption of Judge Guido Calabresi’s radical
proposal to free courts to reinterpret statutes free of statutory constraints that the legislature has failed to “update” in response to postenactment developments.279 To varying degrees, statutes do constrain
274
Indeed, the state law on which the Court relied was exclusively statutory. See id. at
390 (“In the United States, every state today has enacted a wrongful-death statute.”).
275
Id. at 388–89.
276
Justice Harlan drew support from James McCauley Landis’s classic article, STATUTES
AND THE SOURCES OF LAW in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213 (1934), reprinted in 2 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 7 (1965). Justice Harlan, Moragne, 398 U.S. at 392, quoted Professor Landis’s conclusion that “much of what is ordinarily regarded as ‘common law’ finds its source in legislative enactment.” 2 Harv. J. on Legis. at 8. For another insightful exposition of the
interaction between statutes and the common law, see Roger J. Traynor, Statutes Revolving
in Common-Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U. L. REV. 401 (1968).
277
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2012).
278
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
279
See Guido Calabresi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 129 (Harvard Univ.
Press 1982). Judge Calabresi most succinctly states his proposal as a “hypothetical
doctrine:”
Let us suppose that common law courts have the power to treat statutes in
precicsely the same way that they treat the common law. They can . . . alter
a written law or some part of it in the same way (and with the same reluctance) in which they can modify or abandon a common law doctrine or
even a whole complex set of interrelated doctrines.
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the law-making authority delegated to the courts and executive agencies. Even when such constraints, in the face of legislative inaction,
frustrate the law’s response to social developments, courts must respect the constitutional prerogatives of Congress. Such respect, however, does not require ignoring the broad gap-filling authority
Congress typically delegates. Though the delegated authority usually
may not be as broad as that conveyed by section 301 of the LMRA or
the Sherman Act, few statutes, including employment statues like Title
VII, include language that can or is intended by Congress to anticipate and answer all doctrinal questions. If a statute is not to be implemented by an executive agency that is delegated law-making authority
to fill the statute’s gaps, those questions must be answered by courts
free to consider the answers state courts have provided to cognate
questions.
Some might argue that federal law-making in the exercise of statutory authority cannot be as dynamic as Justice Harlan’s refashioning
of maritime law in Moragne because the Court cannot as readily reinterpret a statutory provision as it can a principle of federal common
law not derived from a statutory source.280 Yet, in Boys Markets, Inc. v.
Retail Clerks Union, Local 770,281 the Court overruled one of its most
important early interpretations of section 301(a) of the LMRA282 in
light of a different understanding of what could advance “the congressional policy favoring the voluntary establishment of a mechanism for
the peaceful resolution of labor disputes.”283 And the Court, without
any Congressional modification of the Sherman Act, has overruled
numerous prior decisions in light of a better understanding of how to
best serve the statute’s goals of benefitting consumers through efficient competition.284 The employment-law doctrines fashioned in the
decisions considered in this Essay provide as clear examples of judicial
law-making as do section 301 or Sherman Act decisions. The employment-law decisions, like section 301 or Sherman Act decisions, made
law; they did not simply determine what law Congress made. There is
Id. at 82.
280
See, e.g., Levi, supra note 19, at 523–24 (stating that once statutory legislative intent
is ironed out by the courts the judicial interpretation is essentially fixed).
281
398 U.S. 235 (1970).
282
See id. at 242; Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1970) (holding that
the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act bar federal court injunctions of
a strike in breach of a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement).
283
398 U.S. at 253. The Boys Market Court held that federal courts can issue injunctions to enforce no-strike clauses in collective bargaining agreements where the enjoined
strike is over a grievance subject to arbitration under the agreement. Id. at 253–54.
284
See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7 (1997) (overruling Albrecht v. Herald
Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) to hold that vertical maximum price fixing is not a per se violation of section 1 of Sherman Act); Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58
(1977) (overruling the per se rule against vertical territorial restraints stated in United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)).
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thus no reason why these decisions could not be modified in response
to a better understanding of how statutory purposes might be served
within intended statutory constraints, and no reason that innovative
decisions by state courts could not contribute to that
understanding.285
The more common flow of influence in modern judicial law-making, nonetheless, is likely to be from the Supreme Court to the state
courts. The Supreme Court by virtue of its placement at the top of
the American judicial hierarchy is more likely to influence even when
it cannot command. This Essay has attempted to explain, through
illustrations drawn from recent employment-law developments, how
the Court retains in an era of statutory law much of the capability to
influence state law that it claimed in the general common-law era of
Swift.

285
For instance, state-law decisions refining the distinction between employees and
independent contractors could provide support for the Supreme Court’s ultimate explicit
acceptance of the entrepreneurial-control test stated in section 1.01 of the Restatement of
Employment Law. See supra text accompanying notes 68–70.
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